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Abstract	
This	 article	 critically	 examines	 the	 New	 South	 Wales	 State	 Government’s	 latest	 policy	
response	 to	 the	problem	of	alcohol‐related	violence	and	anxiety	about	 ‘one	punch’	killings:	
the	recently	enacted	Crimes	and	Other	Legislation	Amendment	(Assault	and	Intoxication)	Act	
2014	(NSW).	Based	on	an	analysis	of	both	the	circumstances	out	of	which	it	emerged,	and	the	
terms	 in	which	 the	 new	offences	 of	 assault	 causing	 death	 and	 assault	 causing	 death	while	
intoxicated	have	been	defined,	 I	argue	 that	 the	Act	represents	another	example	of	 criminal	
law	‘reform’	that	is	devoid	of	principle,	produces	a	lack	of	coherence	in	the	criminal	law	and,	
in	its	operation,	is	unlikely	to	deliver	on	the	promise	of	effective	crime	prevention	in	relation	
to	alcohol‐fuelled	violence.			
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Introduction	
On	 30	 January	 2014	 the	New	 South	Wales	 (NSW)	Parliament	 added	 two	 new	 offences	 to	 the	
Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW):	assault	causing	death,	and	an	aggravated	version	of	that	offence	where	
the	offender	 is	 intoxicated	 at	 the	 time	of	 committing	 the	offence.	 For	only	 the	 second	 time	 in	
recent	history,	the	NSW	Parliament	included	a	mandatory	minimum	sentence	(in	relation	to	the	
aggravated	 offence).2	 This	 article	 critically	 analyses	 both	 the	 content	 of	 the	Crimes	and	Other	
Legislation	Amendment	 (Assault	and	 Intoxication)	Act	2014	 (NSW)	 and	 the	 circumstance	of	 its	
emergence	 and	 enactment.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 Act	 represents	 another	 example	 of	 criminal	 law	
‘reform’	that	is	devoid	of	principle,	produces	a	lack	of	coherence	in	the	criminal	law	and,	in	its	
operation,	 is	 unlikely	 to	 deliver	 on	 the	 promise	 of	 effective	 crime	 prevention	 in	 relation	 to	
alcohol‐fuelled	violence.			
	
The	analysis	presented	in	this	article	is	organised	around	five	inter‐related	criticisms	of	the	Act:		
	
1. The	 speed	 with	 which	 the	 offence	 was	 announced	 and	 passed,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	
intense	 media	 and	 public	 campaign,	 reflected	 a	 classic	 knee‐jerk	 ‘law	 and	 order’	
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response	with	all	the	related	pitfalls	of	poor	drafting,	lack	of	coherence	and	operational	
difficulty;		
2. The	 adoption	 of	 an	 ‘assault	 causing	 death’	 offence	 represents	 an	 example	 of	 ‘policy	
transfer’	 from	 the	 Code	 jurisdictions	 in	 Australia	 to	 the	 common	 law	 States	 without	
proper	‘translation’;		
3. The	 failure	 to	 give	 principled	 consideration	 to	 how	 the	 new	 offences	 relate	 to	 the	
hierarchy	 of	 existing	 fatality	 crimes	 in	 NSW	 contributes	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 coherence	 in	 the	
criminal	law	and	undermines	the	principles	of	‘fair	labelling’;	
4. The	offence	definition	is	complex,	confusing	and	exemplifies	the	vice	of	‘particularism’	in	
criminal	law	drafting;	and		
5. The	framing	of	the	offence	is	likely	to	lead	to	operational	difficulties	which	will,	in	turn,	
lead	 to	 community	 disappointment	 as	 the	 high	 expectations	 for	 real	 action	 on	 ‘one	
punch’	deaths	will	not	be	met.	
	
Before	turning	to	each	of	these	criticisms	in	turn,	 I	will	provide	an	overview	of	the	 legislation,	
and	the	background	to	its	enactment.		
	
Overview	of	the	legislation		
On	21	 January	2014,	NSW	Premier	Barry	O’Farrell	 (2014a;	see	also	Miller	2014)	announced	a	
16‐point	plan	to	tackle	drug	and	alcohol	violence	which	included:	
	
 A	new	one‐punch	 law	with	 an	 aggravated	 version	 having	 a	 25	 year	maximum	 and	 an	
eight	 year	 mandatory	 minimum	 sentence	 where	 the	 offender	 is	 intoxicated	 by	 drugs	
and/or	alcohol;	
 New	mandatory	minimum	sentences	 for	certain	violent	offences	where	 the	offender	 is	
intoxicated	by	drugs	and/or	alcohol;3	
 A	maximum	 sentence	 increase	 from	 two	 years	 to	 25	 years	 for	 the	 illegal	 supply	 and	
possession	of	steroids;	
 Increased	on‐the‐spot	fines	for	anti‐social	behaviour;	
 Empowering	police	to	conduct	drug	and	alcohol	testing	on	suspected	offenders;	
 Introduction	 of	 1.30am	 lockouts	 and	 3:00am	 last	 drinks	 across	 an	 expanded	 CBD	
precinct;	
 New	state‐wide	10:00pm	closing	times	for	all	bottle	shops;	
 Introduction	of	a	risk‐based	licensing	scheme	with	higher	fees	imposed	for	venues	and	
outlets	 that	 have	 later	 trading	 hours,	 poor	 compliance	 histories	 or	 are	 in	 high	 risk	
locations;	
 Free	buses	running	every	ten	minutes	from	Sydney’s	Kings	Cross	to	the	city’s	CBD;	and	
 A	freeze	on	granting	new	liquor	licenses.	
	
Just	 over	 a	week	 later,	 on	 30	 January	 2014,	without	 any	 known	public	 consultation	 from	 the	
NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	(NSWLRC)	or	other	expert	groups,	Premier	O’Farrell	read	for	a	
second	time	the	Crimes	and	Other	Legislation	Amendment	(Assault	and	Intoxication)	Bill	2014	
and	 the	 Liquor	 Amendment	 Bill	 2014.4	 With	 alarming	 speed,	 the	 Bills	 were	 passed	 by	 both	
houses	without	substantial	amendment	and	on	the	same	day	they	were	introduced.	The	Crimes	
and	Other	Legislation	Amendment	(Assault	and	Intoxication)	Act	2014	(‘the	Act’)	received	assent	
and	commenced	operation	 the	next	day,	31	 January	2014.	Premier	O’Farrell	 thereby	achieved	
his	 wish,	 announced	 to	 the	 media	 and	 to	 Parliament	 in	 introducing	 the	 Bill,	 to	 have	 the	
provisions	up	and	running	for	the	weekend	(O’Farrell	2014b).	The	Liquor	Amendment	Act	2014	
substantially	came	into	force	on	5	February	2014.	
	
The	 two	 Acts	 introduce	 into	 law	 all	 elements	 of	 the	 16‐point	 Plan	 announced	 on	 21	 January	
2014	 –	 aside	 from	 the	 introduction	 of	 mandatory	 minimum	 sentences	 for	 a	 range	 of	 other	
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existing	violent	offences	where	the	offender	is	intoxicated	by	drugs	and/or	alcohol.5	While	the	
focus	of	this	article	is	on	the	new	offence	of	assault	causing	death,	 it	 is	noted	that	the	Act	also	
significantly	 increases	 the	penalties	 for	 certain	public	order	offences	 in	 the	Summary	Offences	
Act	1988	(NSW)	(notably	raising	the	maximum	penalty	for	the	continuation	of	intoxication	and	
disorderly	 behaviour	 following	 a	move	 on	 direction	 in	 s	 9	 from	6	 penalty	 units	 ($660)	 to	 15	
penalty	units	($1650)	and	the	penalty	notice	offences	for	offensive	conduct	(from	$200	to	$500),	
offensive	 language	 (from	 $200	 to	 $500)	 and	 s	 9	 (from	 $200	 to	 $1,100)).	 While	 these	 last	
amendments	will	not	be	addressed	further	in	this	paper,	they	are	of	great	significance	given	the	
frequency	 with	 which	 they	 are	 charged,	 the	 lack	 of	 clarity	 over	 the	 legal	 elements	 of	 such	
offences	(Quilter	and	McNamara	2013),	and	the	possible	impact	on	license	disqualifications	(for	
unpaid	fines)	and,	ultimately,	imprisonment	for	driving	whilst	disqualified.		
	
Assault	causing	death:	The	offences		
The	Act	 introduces	 the	basic	offence	of	 ‘Assault	 causing	death’	 in	 s	25A(1)	and	an	aggravated	
version	of	that	offence	in	s	25A(2)	into	the	Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW)	Pt	3,	Div	1	 ‘Homicide’.	This	
amendment	constitutes	the	 first	substantive	change	 to	 the	offence	structure	of	homicide	since	
1951	 when	 infanticide	 (s	 22A)	 was	 inserted	 by	 the	 Crimes	 (Amendment)	 Act	 1951	 (NSW).	
Section	25A	is	in	the	following	terms:		
	
25A	Assault	causing	death	
	
(1)	 A	person	is	guilty	of	an	offence	under	this	subsection	if:	
	
(a)	the	person	assaults	another	person	by	intentionally	hitting	the	other	person	
with	any	part	of	the	person’s	body	or	with	an	object	held	by	the	person,	and	
	
(b)	the	assault	is	not	authorised	or	excused	by	law,	and	
	
(c)	the	assault	causes	the	death	of	the	other	person.	
	
Maximum	penalty:	Imprisonment	for	20	years.	
	
(2)	 A	person	who	is	of	or	above	the	age	of	18	years	is	guilty	of	an	offence	under	this	
subsection	 if	 the	 person	 commits	 an	 offence	 under	 subsection	 (1)	 when	 the	
person	is	intoxicated.	
	
Maximum	penalty:	Imprisonment	for	25	years.	
	
(3)	 For	the	purposes	of	this	section,	an	assault	causes	the	death	of	a	person	whether	
the	person	is	killed	as	a	result	of	the	injuries	received	directly	from	the	assault	or	
from	hitting	the	ground	or	an	object	as	a	consequence	of	the	assault.	
	
(4)	 In	proceedings	for	an	offence	under	subsection	(1)	or	(2),	it	 is	not	necessary	to	
prove	that	the	death	was	reasonably	foreseeable.	
	
(5)	 It	is	a	defence	in	proceedings	for	an	offence	under	subsection	(2):	
	
(a)	if	the	intoxication	of	the	accused	was	not	self‐induced	(within	the	meaning	of	
Part	11A),	or	
	
(b)	if	the	accused	had	a	significant	cognitive	impairment	at	the	time	the	offence	
was	 alleged	 to	 have	 been	 committed	 (not	 being	 a	 temporary	 self‐induced	
impairment).	
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(6)	 In	proceedings	for	an	offence	under	subsection	(2):	
	
(a)	evidence	may	be	given	of	the	presence	and	concentration	of	any	alcohol,	drug	
or	 other	 substance	 in	 the	 accused’s	 breath,	 blood	 or	 urine	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	
alleged	 offence	 as	 determined	 by	 an	 analysis	 carried	 out	 in	 accordance	 with	
Division	 4	 of	 Part	 10	 of	 the	Law	Enforcement	 (Powers	and	Responsibilities)	Act	
2002,	and	
	
(b)	 the	 accused	 is	 conclusively	 presumed	 to	 be	 intoxicated	 by	 alcohol	 if	 the	
prosecution	 proves	 in	 accordance	 with	 an	 analysis	 carried	 out	 in	 accordance	
with	 that	 Division	 that	 there	 was	 present	 in	 the	 accused’s	 breath	 or	 blood	 a	
concentration	 of	 0.15	 grams	 or	more	 of	 alcohol	 in	 210	 litres	 of	 breath	 or	 100	
millilitres	of	blood	…	.	
	
Background:	Responding	to	a	penal	populist	campaign	
How	was	it	that	within	the	space	of	just	over	a	week,	without	a	public	consultation	process	and	
without	any	apparent	input	from	the	NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	(NSWLRC)	or	other	expert	
groups,	 the	 Government	moved	 from	 the	 announcement	 of	 a	 16‐point	 plan	 to	 tackle	 alcohol‐
related	violence	to	fully	operational	legislation	which	had	exceptional	features:	invoking	for	only	
the	second	time	in	recent	NSW	history	the	policy	of	mandatory	sentencing	and	constituting	the	
first	additional	offence	to	the	law	of	‘homicide’	since	1951?	I	argue	that	the	haste	with	which	the	
legislation	 was	 drafted,	 passed	 and	 commenced	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 the	 intense	 media	 and	
public	campaign	that	was	triggered	by	the	sentencing	in	November	2013	of	Kieran	Loveridge	for	
the	manslaughter	of	Thomas	Kelly,	a	campaign	that	dramatically	intensified	over	the	summer	of	
December/January	 2014.	 It	 was	 within	 this	 context	 that	 a	 ‘penal	 populist’	 (Bottoms	 1995;	
Garland	2001;	Lacey	2008;	Roberts	et	al.	2003;	Pratt	2007;	Pratt	and	Eriksson	2013),	 ‘law	and	
order’	response	(Hogg	and	Brown	1998)	was	offered	by	the	NSW	Government	in	an	attempt	to	
quell	 community	 concern	 –	 a	 trend	 in	 crime	 policy	 development	 that	 has	 been	 discussed	
elsewhere	(Brown	2013;	Loughnan	2009,	2010).	
	
The	sentencing	of	Kieran	Loveridge	for	the	death	of	Thomas	Kelly	
On	8	November	2013,	 Justice	Campbell	sentenced	Kieran	Loveridge	to	a	 total	of	7	years	and	2	
months	 for	 the	 combined	 manslaughter	 of	 Thomas	 Kelly	 and	 four	 other	 unrelated	 assaults,	
being	6	years	 for	manslaughter	 (4	years	non‐parole	period)	 and	1	year	and	2	months	 for	 the	
assaults	(R	v	Loveridge	[2013]	NSWSC	1638	at	[14]‐[18]).	Over	a	year	earlier,	in	July	2012,	in	an	
unprovoked	 attack,	 Mr	 Kelly	 had	 died	 from	 a	 single	 punch	 by	 Mr	 Loveridge,	 when	 he	 was	
walking	 on	 Victoria	 Street,	 Kings	 Cross.	 Mr	 Kelly	 fell	 to	 the	 ground,	 hitting	 his	 head	 on	 the	
pavement	suffering	massive	head	injuries	and	never	regaining	consciousness.	The	tragic	death	
of	Mr	Kelly	triggered	an	immediate	and,	until	the	sentencing	of	Loveridge	in	November	2013,	a	
progressive	populist	 campaign	around	 the	 issue	of	 alcohol‐fuelled	 violence	 to	which	 the	NSW	
Government	 responded	with	 an	uncharacteristic	multi‐faceted	 and	nuanced	 response	 (Quilter	
2013;	 Quilter	 2014a).	 The	 sentencing	 of	 Mr	 Loveridge,	 however,	 sparked	 immediate	 outrage	
from	the	family,	the	public,	and	the	NSW	Government,	and	a	more	punitive	rhetoric	entered	the	
debate	(for	example,	see	Bibby	2013).		
	
On	 the	same	day	as	Mr	Loveridge’s	sentencing,	 the	NSW	Attorney	General,	Greg	Smith	SC	MP,	
released	a	media	statement	asking	the	DPP	to	consider	an	appeal	against	the	sentence	handed	
down	 (Smith	 2013a)	 and,	 by	 12	 November	 2013,	 the	 Attorney	 General	 had	 announced	 a	
proposed	so‐called	‘one	punch’	law	for	NSW:	
	
Julia	Quilter:	One‐punch	Laws	…	Implications	for	NSW	Criminal	Law	
	
IJCJ&SD				85	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2014	3(1)	
The	proposed	bill	will	be	based	on	a	Western	Australian	so‐called	‘one	punch	law’	
which	carries	a	maximum	penalty	of	10	years	–	the	laws	I	am	proposing	for	NSW	
will	carry	a	maximum	penalty	of	20	years	imprisonment…	
	
The	new	offence	and	proposed	penalty	will	send	the	strongest	message	to	violent	
and	drunken	thugs	that	assaulting	people	is	not	a	rite	of	passage	on	a	boozy	night	
out	–	your	behaviour	can	have	the	most	serious	consequences	and	the	community	
expects	you	to	pay	a	heavy	price	for	your	actions.	(Smith	2013b)		
	
Soon	 after	 the	 sentence	 was	 handed	 down,	 the	 Kelly	 family	 started	 a	 petition	 to	 the	 NSW	
Premier6	 calling	 for	minimum	 sentencing	 laws	 in	 cases	 of	manslaughter.	 Broader	 support	 for	
these	measures	was	 found	in	the	 ‘Enough	is	Enough’	campaign7	and	a	public	rally	was	held	 in	
Sydney’s	Martin	Place	on	19	November	2013	calling	 for	 tougher	and	mandatory	sentences	for	
violent	offenders	(Wood	2013).	
	
On	 14	 November	 2013,	 the	 NSW	 Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions	 (DPP),	 Lloyd	 Babb	 SC,	
announced	an	appeal	of	Mr	Loveridge’s	sentence	for	manifest	inadequacy.	He	also	indicated	that	
he	 would	 ask	 the	 NSW	 Court	 of	 Criminal	 Appeal	 (NSWCCA)	 to	 issue	 a	 guideline	 judgment	
(Coulton	2013).	
	
The	Attorney‐General’s	announcement	of	an	apparently	‘tough	law	and	order’	response	with	the	
new	 one‐punch	 law	 together	 with	 the	 DPP’s	 announcement	 of	 an	 appeal	 of	 Mr	 Loveridge’s	
sentence	 for	 ‘manifest	 inadequacy’	 and	 the	 application	 for	 a	 guideline	 judgment	 may	 have	
calmed	public	sentiment	and	slowed	media	agitation.		However,	following	another	serious	one‐
punch	assault	(of	23‐year‐old	Michael	McEwen,	at	Bondi	Beach,	Sydney,	on	14	December	2013,	
which	put	him	in	a	coma	for	a	week)	and	a	one‐punch	assault	on	New	Year’s	Eve	that	ultimately	
led	to	the	death	of	18‐year‐old	Daniel	Christie	(eerily	in	King’s	Cross,	very	near	the	spot	where	
Mr	 Kelly	 was	 killed	 in	 2012),	 Sydney’s	 two	 newspapers	 ran	 major	 campaigns	 in	 relation	 to	
alcohol‐fuelled	violence.	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	revived	the	‘Safer	Sydney’	campaign	it	had	
initiated	after	Mr	Kelly’s	death,	and	The	Telegraph	ran	the	‘Enough’	campaign.		
	
In	many	 critiques	 of	 penal	 populism,	 the	 allegation	 is	 often	made	 that	 the	media	 distorts	 the	
‘facts’	 and	 fails	 to	 provide	 information	 to	 the	 public	 in	 a	 balanced	 way	 so	 fostering	 punitive	
opinion	(for	example,	see	Roberts	2008).	While	it	is	not	the	subject	of	this	article,	it	is	important	
to	note	that	both	the	Safer	Sydney	and	Enough	campaigns	were	not	exclusively	punitive	in	their	
treatment	of	the	issue.	While	there	was	a	more	classic	‘demonising’	of	recent	offenders	in	a	way	
that	did	not	happen	with	Mr	Loveridge	–	in	particular,	of	Shaun	McNeil	who	had	been	charged	
with	assaulting	Mr	Christie	(Fife‐Yeomans	and	Wood	2014)	–	and	calls	for	mandatory	minimum	
sentencing,	 the	 campaigns	 also	 called	 for	 additional	 actions:	 the	 introduction	 of	 ‘Newcastle‐
style’	1.00am	lockout	measures	across	the	Sydney	CBD;	more	public	transport;	public	education	
on	drinking	(including	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	running	a	competition	for	the	public	to	come	
up	 with	 a	 new	 creative	 advertising	 campaign	 similar	 to	 the	 ‘Pinkie	 campaign’	 that	 targeted	
violent	alcohol‐related	offending8);	and	risk‐based	licensing	measures.	
	
Victims’	families	were	also	prominent	in	the	public	discourse.	For	instance,	after	the	assault	on	
Mr	Christie,	the	Kelly	family	expanded	the	original	November	2013	petition	to	include	calls	for	
the	following	to	be	added	as	aggravating	factors	in	sentencing:	the	offender	being	drunk	at	the	
time	of	committing	the	offence;	the	youth	and	inability	of	victims	to	defend	themselves;	and	the	
offender	being	on	a	‘good	behaviour	bond’	at	the	time	of	the	offence.	Robert	McEwen,	father	of	
Michael	McEwen,	spoke	out	after	his	son	was	assaulted,	calling	for	a	number	of	measures	which	
targeted	alcohol‐fuelled	violence	to	be	immediately	adopted	by	the	NSW	Government	including	
the	 ‘Newcastle	solution’	and	a	national	ban	on	political	donations	by	the	alcohol	and	gambling	
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industries.9	At	 the	 funeral	of	Daniel	Christie	on	17	 January	2014,	his	 father,	Michael,	made	an	
impassioned	plea	for	young	people	to	stop	the	violence	(Dingle	2014).	
	
Australia’s	 two	most	 senior	 political	 figures,	 Prime	 Minister	 Tony	 Abbott	 and	 the	 Governor‐	
General,	 also	 weighed	 into	 the	 debate.	 Mr	 Abbott	 stated	 he	 was	 ‘appalled’	 by	 the	 attacks	 in	
Sydney	and	said	that	there	were	essentially	two	problems:		
	
…	 The	 first	 problem	 is	 the	 binge‐drinking	 culture	 that	 seems	 to	 have	 become	
quite	prevalent	amongst	youngsters	in	the	last	couple	of	decades.		
	
The	second	problem,	and	this	is	a	truly	insidious	thing	–	this	rise	of	the	disturbed	
individual	who	goes	out	not	looking	for	a	fight,	but	looking	for	a	victim.	…	
	
I	think	really,	the	police,	the	courts,	the	judges	ought	to	absolutely	throw	the	book	
at	people	who	perpetrate	this	kind	of	gratuitous	unprovoked	violence.	(ABC	News	
2014)	
	
The	Governor‐General,	Quentin	Bryce,	made	the	extraordinary	decision	to	attend	the	funeral	of	
Mr	Christie,	indicating	that	her	presence	was	‘as	an	expression	of	the	community’s	revulsion’	of	
violence	on	Sydney’s	streets	(Robertson	2014).	After	the	funeral,	she	stated:	
	
As	 Governor‐General	 and	 if	 I	 may	 say,	 as	 a	 parent	 for	 all	 parents,	 all	
grandmothers,	all	 fathers	and	grandfathers	there	can	be	no	place,	no	excuse,	no	
tolerance	 for	gratuitous	violence	 in	our	society.	…	 It’s	unacceptable,	and	 it’s	un‐
Australian.	(Ralston	2014)	
	
With	the	media	running	hard	on	the	issue	–	and	clearly	backed	by	public	opinion	(exemplified	
by	 the	multiplicity	 of	 letters	 to	 the	 Editor	 during	 the	 December/January	 2014	 period	 on	 the	
issue	 in	 both	 the	 Sydney	 Morning	 Herald	 and	 The	 Telegraph)	 –	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 was	
enormous	 pressure	 for	 the	 NSW	 Government	 and	 particularly	 the	 Premier	 to	 act.	 Just	 one	
example	 indicative	of	 the	 intensity	of	 this	 campaign	 is	The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	 running	an	
editorial	comparing	Premier	O’Farrell’s	absence	in	the	debate	on	alcohol‐fuelled	violence	to	the	
cartoon	 figure	Where’s	Wally?	 (The	Sydney	Morning	Herald	 Editorial	2014).	 It	was	within	 this	
pressured	environment	that	the	Premier	announced	his	16‐point	plan	and	followed	only	a	week	
later	 with	 hastily	 and	 poorly	 drafted	 legislation	 (as	 will	 be	 discussed	 below),	 reflecting	 yet	
another	 example	 of	 a	 government	 being	drawn	 to	 a	 ‘law	 and	order’,	 simplistic	 penal	 populist	
response	 –	 but	 one	 that	 will	 ultimately	 fail	 to	 deliver	 what	 the	 public	 expect,	 including	
preventing	crime.	
	
It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 history	 of	 initiating	 and	 introducing	 one‐punch	 laws	 in	 Australia	
(Quilter	2014b)	demonstrates	similar	patterns	of	intense	media	coverage	of,	and	public	concern	
over,	one‐punch	deaths	and	the	introduction	of	hastily	drafted	assault	causing	death	provisions.	
Against	this	‘tough	on	law	and	order’	style	of	criminal	law	reform,	it	is	notable	that	where	more	
considered	assessments	of	the	need	for	such	offences	has	been	undertaken,	in	particular	by	law	
reform	commissions	in	Australia,	they	have	expressly	recommended	against	their	introduction	
(see	Queensland	Law	Reform	Commission	2008;	Western	Australian	Law	Reform	Commission	
2007;	also	Quilter	2014b).	
	
Policy	transferred	but	not	translated	
The	second	criticism	is	that	the	adoption	by	the	NSW	Government	of	an	‘assault	causing	death’	
provision	 represents	 an	 ill‐considered	 policy	 transfer	 from	 the	 Code	 jurisdictions	 to	 the	
common	law	States	but	without	 ‘translation’.	 In	 the	area	of	crime	control,	Newburn	and	 Jones	
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have	 discussed	 the	 problems	 of	 ‘policy	 transfer’	 to	 different	 contexts	 (Jones	 and	 Newburn	
2002a,	2002b,	2005,	2006;	Newburn	2002).	Following	this	trend,	here	we	see	a	specific	policy	
addressing	a	perceived	‘gap’	in	the	law	in	the	Code‐based	jurisdictions	being	‘transplanted’	onto	
the	very	different	context	of	the	common	law	in	NSW.	However,	there	was	neither	a	gap	on	the	
statute	 books	 in	 NSW	 nor	 an	 operational	 gap:	 manslaughter	 convictions	 were	 consistently	
achieved	in	NSW	under	existing	laws.		
	
Assault	 causing	death	provisions	were	 introduced	 in	 the	Code	 jurisdictions	 to	 fill	 a	 perceived	
‘gap’	in	the	law’s	operation	in	the	context	of	one‐punch	manslaughters	(for	example,	see	Elferink	
2012).	This	is	largely	because	of	the	operation	of	the	‘accident’	defence	which	applies	in	each	of	
the	 Code	 jurisdictions	 for	 manslaughter	 (Quilter	 2014b;	 Fairall	 2012).	 The	 accident	 defence	
precludes	criminal	responsibility	for	an	event	where	it	can	be	said	to	have	occurred	by	‘accident’	
–	where	an	accident	is	determined	by	an	objective	test	being	a	result	that	was	not	intended	by	
the	 perpetrator	 and	 not	 reasonably	 foreseeable	 by	 an	 ordinary	 person	 (Kaporonowski	 v	 The	
Queen	(1973)	133	CLR	209,	231	(Gibbs	J)).	Thus,	where	there	is	a	one‐punch	manslaughter	and	
the	accident	defence	is	raised,	the	jury	must	be	satisfied	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	the	death	
(that	is,	‘the	event’)	from	the	one	punch	was	reasonably	foreseeable	by	the	ordinary	person.	This	
is	a	very	high	threshold	and	often	may	not	be	satisfied	in	such	situations.	In	other	words,	 ‘one	
punch’	 laws	may	be	 viewed	as	 necessary	 in	 jurisdictions	 such	 as	Western	Australia	 (WA)	not	
because	manslaughter	is	viewed	as	too	light	but	because	manslaughter	may	not	be	available	in	
such	situations	(Quilter	2014b).		
	
By	 contrast,	 involuntary	 manslaughter	 and,	 relevantly,	 unlawful	 and	 dangerous	 act	
manslaughter,	is	defined	differently	in	the	common	law	States	(including	NSW)	and	with	a	lower	
threshold.	For	unlawful	and	dangerous	act	manslaughter	in	NSW,	the	Crown	must	prove	beyond	
reasonable	doubt	that:	the	death	of	a	person	was	caused	by	a	positive	(or	deliberate)	act	of	the	
offender	 that	 was	 unlawful	 (for	 example,	 an	 assault);	 the	 offender	 must	 intend	 to	 commit	 a	
breach	of	the	criminal	law	as	alleged;	and	the	act	must	be	dangerous.	The	most	relevant	aspect	
of	these	elements	is	the	final	one:	that	the	act	be	dangerous.	The	test	for	dangerousness	was	set	
out	in	the	High	Court	decision	of	Wilson,	with	this	being	an	objective	test:	would	the	reasonable	
person,	 in	 the	 position	 of	 the	 defendant,	 have	 appreciated	 that	 the	 unlawful	 act	 exposed	 the	
victim	to	an	appreciable	risk	of	serious	 injury?	(Wilson	v	R	(1992)	174	CLR	313,	333).	 	 In	other	
words,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 Code	 jurisdictions	 and	 the	 law	 in	 NSW	 (and	 the	 other	
common	law	States)	is	that	the	objective	test	of	‘dangerousness’	requires	‘an	appreciable	risk	of	
serious	injury’	(for	instance,	from	the	punch)	but	does	not	require,	as	in	the	Code	jurisdictions,	
that	 the	 death	 be	 reasonably	 foreseeable	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 punch	 (Quilter	 2014b;	 see	 also	
Tomsen	and	Crofts	2012).		
	
To	put	it	simply,	in	NSW,	there	was	no	legal	gap	that	needed	to	be	filled	with	a	one‐punch	law.	
Furthermore,	 in	 NSW	 (and	 the	 other	 common	 law	 States),	 there	 is	 no	 defence	 of	 accident	 as	
there	 is	 in	 the	Code	 jurisdiction,	 something	 that	 appears	 to	have	 confused	 the	 drafters	 of	 the	
new	offence.	Thus,	s	25A(4)	of	the	Act	expressly	provides	that	it	is	not	necessary	to	prove	‘that	
the	death	was	reasonably	foreseeable’	for	an	offence	under	s	25A(1)	or	(2).	Presumably	the	new	
legislation	was	modelled	on	sub‐s	(2)	of	the	equivalent	Western	Australian	legislation,	s	281	of	
the	 Criminal	 Code	 Act	 1913	 which	 purports	 to	 exclude	 accident	 as	 a	 defence.	 However,	 that	
defence	does	not	exist	in	NSW	and	thus	the	provision	is	redundant	in	this	State.	
	
Not	only	is	there	no	‘gap’	in	the	statute	books	for	a	‘one	punch’	law	to	fill	in	NSW,	there	is	also	no	
operational	gap.	Manslaughter	convictions	for	one‐punch	manslaughters	are	being	achieved.	In	
a	 previous	 study,	 Quilter	 isolated	 18	 cases	 of	what	may	 be	 called	 ‘one	 punch’	manslaughters	
from	1998	to	2013	(Quilter	2014b).	Significantly,	in	all	but	one	case	the	matter	did	not	proceed	
to	trial	with	the	offender	pleading	guilty	to	manslaughter.		
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The	hierarchy	of	criminal	offences	
The	 third	 criticism	 to	 be	made	 of	 the	 Act	 is	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 Government	 to	 give	 principled	
consideration	 to	 where	 assault	 causing	 death	 offences	 sit	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 fatality	 crimes.	
Indeed,	 while	 the	 Australian	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (ABS)	 has	 created	 a	 National	 Index	 Offence	
(NOI)10	 and	 a	 separate	 seriousness	 ranking	 was	 produced	 by	 the	 NSW	 Judicial	 Commission	
(MacKinnell,	Poletti	and	Holmes	2010),	there	has	been	little	scholarly	analysis	of	the	hierarchy	
of	offence	seriousness	(Clarkson	and	Cunningham	2008;	Davis	and	Kemp	1994;	Walker	1978).	
This	omission	is	significant	as	hierarchy	analysis	could	be	used	as	a	normative,	principled	basis	
for	 assessing	 the	 need	 or	 otherwise	 for	 offence	 creation	 and	 drafting.	 That	 is,	 it	 could	 be	 an	
important	additional	dimension	to	the	scholarship	that	has	proliferated	in	the	last	decade	on	the	
legitimate	 limits	 of	 the	 criminal	 law	 (see,	 for	 example,	 Brown	 2013;	 Duff	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Husak	
2008;	Lacey	2009).	The	failure	to	consider	the	hierarchy	of	offence	seriousness	contributes	to	a	
lack	of	coherence	in	the	criminal	law	and	undermines	the	principles	of	‘fair	labelling’	which	play	
an	 important	 communicative	 function	 of	 the	 criminal	 law	 (Ashworth	 2009;	 Chalmers	 and	
Leverick	2008;	Duff	1999,	2000).		
	
As	mentioned	above,	no	law	reform	commission	in	Australia	has	recommended	the	introduction	
of	a	‘one	punch’	law.	One	of	the	consequences	of	this	is	that	the	question	of	where	offences	like	s	
281	of	the	Western	Australian	Criminal	Code	and,	now,	s	25A	of	the	Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW),	sit	
in	the	hierarchy	of	fatality	crimes,	has	received	little	attention.	Such	problems	are	exacerbated	
where	new	criminal	offences	are	brought	 into	being	under	conditions	of	haste	and	urgency	as	
occurred	in	NSW	in	January	2014.	The	question	of	hierarchy	is	an	important	one	to	consider	in	
order	to	assess	whether	there	is	a	‘match’	between	the	perceived	need	for	a	new	offence	and	the	
nature	of	the	offence	itself,	and	so	take	account	of	the	wider	and	longer‐term	implications	of	a	
contemplated	change	to	the	criminal	law.		
	
The	Law	Reform	Commission	of	Ireland	(LRCI)	did	recommend	the	introduction	of	a	‘one	punch’	
law	 as	part	 of	 its	 review	of	homicide	 and	manslaughter	 in	 2008,	 and	 explicitly	 addressed	 the	
question	of	hierarchy.	Consideration	of	 the	LRCI’s	analysis	 is	 illuminating	 (see	Quilter	2014b).	
The	LRCI	recommended	the	introduction	of	a	‘one	punch’	law	on	the	basis	that	deaths	caused	in	
this	 way	 often	 involved	 insufficient	 culpability	 to	 warrant	 a	 manslaughter	 conviction	 (LRCI	
2008).	That	is,	a	crime	of	assault	causing	death	does	not	represent	a	more	punitive	response	to	
one‐punch	deaths	than	manslaughter,	but	creates	a	less	serious	offence	that	reflects	the	reduced	
culpability.	 Therefore,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 or	 ladder	 of	 fatality	 crimes,	 assault	 causing	
death	logically	sits	on	the	third	tier,	below	manslaughter,	with	murder	at	the	top.	Although	this	
approach	 to	hierarchy	was	not	 articulated	 in	 the	 legislative	debates	 surrounding	 s	281	of	 the	
Criminal	Code	1913	(WA)	it	has	been	confirmed	by	the	Western	Australian	courts’	application	of	
the	 assault	 causing	 death	 offence:	 in	 the	 seriousness	 hierarchy	 of	 crimes	 causing	 death,	 the	
crime	of	unlawful	assault	causing	death	sits	beneath	manslaughter	(see	Quilter	2014b).		
	
This	comparative	analysis	indicates	that	the	introduction	of	an	assault	causing	death	provision	
is	 not,	 by	 definition,	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 offences,	 but	 what	 is	 necessary	 is	 to	
appropriately	encapsulate	–	 in	terms	of	 ‘label’,	penalty	and	conduct	covered	–	where	it	sits	on	
the	seriousness	hierarchy	or	 ladder.	 Its	 logical	 location	 is	on	 the	 third	 tier,	below	murder	and	
manslaughter	–	because	it	has	neither	the	subjective	fault	elements	of	murder	nor	the	objective	
fault	 elements	 of	manslaughter	 –	 and	 should	 be	 confined	 to	 the	 least	 culpable	 forms	 of	 fatal	
conduct.	 As	 a	matter	 of	 principle,	 the	 offence	 should	 be	 defined	 accordingly.	While	 the	 NSW	
offence	arguably	encapsulates	an	appropriate	level	of	culpability	in	terms	of	the	label	(‘Assault	
causing	 death’),	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 following	 section	 of	 the	 article,	 it	 does	 not	 appropriately	
confine	the	relevant	conduct	 to	the	 least	serious	matters.	 Its	 location	 in	Pt	3	 ‘Offences	Against	
the	Person’,	Div	1	‘Homicide’	after	s	24	(the	punishment	for	manslaughter)	is	fitting	but,	as	will	
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be	discussed,	the	maximum	penalties	particularly	in	the	case	of	the	aggravated	offence	defined	
by	s	25A(2),	are	out	of	sync	with	this	hierarchy.		
	
Although	it	is	at	odds	with	the	‘get	tough’	‘law	and	order’	rhetoric	of	the	NSW	Government,	the	
maximum	 penalty	 assigned	 to	 the	 basic	 offence	 of	 assault	 causing	 death	 does	 adhere	 to	 this	
hierarchy:	a	one‐punch	fatality	is	a	less	serious	crime	than	manslaughter	and	sits	above	that	of	
an	assault.	Thus,	the	basic	offence	of	assault	causing	death	(s	25A(1))	has	a	maximum	penalty	of	
20	years	being	less	than	the	maximum	of	25	years	for	manslaughter:	see	s	24.	Furthermore,	the	
s	25A(1)	offence	is	a	statutory	alternative	verdict	to	murder	and	manslaughter	(s	25A(7))	and	
also	to	the	s	25A(2)	offence	(see	s	25A(8)).		
	
The	aggravated	offence	in	s	25A(2)	fits	much	less	comfortably	within	the	hierarchy.	On	the	one	
hand,	 the	 offence	 remains	 a	 statutory	 alternative	 verdict	 to	 murder	 and	 manslaughter,	
suggesting	it	is	lower	in	the	seriousness	hierarchy	than	both	offences	(s	25A(7)).	On	the	other	
hand,	 the	 offence	 has	 the	 same	 maximum	 penalty	 as	 manslaughter	 but	 with	 the	 mandatory	
minimum	 sentence	 of	 8	 years	 (s	 25B(1)),11	which	makes	 the	 offence	potentially	more	 serious	
than	manslaughter,	particularly	when	account	is	taken	of	sentencing	statistics	for	manslaughter.	
For	instance,	the	average	sentence	for	the	18	one‐punch	manslaughter	cases	in	Quilter’s	study	
(2014b)	was	5	years	and	2	months	with	an	average	non‐parole	period	of	3	years	and	3	months.	
The	median	sentence	was	5	years	and	11	months	and	the	median	non‐parole	period	was	3	years	
and	 6	months.	 	 The	 range	 of	 sentences	was	 3	 years	 to	 7	 years	 (and	 the	 range	 of	 non‐parole	
periods	was	1	year	5	months	to	5	years	8	months).	Sentencing	statistics	provided	to	me	by	the	
Judicial	 Commission	 of	 New	 South	Wales	 for	 the	 seven	 year	 period	 between	 April	 2006	 and	
March	 2013	 indicate	 that	 the	 median	 sentence	 for	 manslaughter	 is	 7	 years	 with	 sentences	
ranging	from	36	months	to	more	than	20	years.	While	it	is	difficult	to	draw	any	conclusions	from	
the	 Judicial	 Information	 Research	 System	 (JIRS)	 sentencing	 statistics	 without	 knowing	 more	
about	the	individual	cases,	it	is	noteworthy	that	both	the	median	one‐punch	sentences	and	the	
median	sentences	for	manslaughter	cases	as	a	whole	are	below	the	8‐year	mandatory	minimum	
for	s	25A(2)	offences.		
	
Furthermore,	while	a	mandatory	minimum	is	typically	understood	to	be	the	minimum	penalty	
in	 relation	 to	 a	 particular	 offence	 (see	 Roth	 2014;	 also	Hoel	 and	Gelb	 2008),	 in	 the	 case	 of	 s	
25A(2)	offences,	s	25B(1)	further	indicates	that	the	mandatory	minimum	period	is	the	same	as	
the	minimum	non‐parole	period	(NPP)	period	of	eight	years	for	that	offence:		
	
(1)	A	court	is	required	to	impose	a	sentence	of	imprisonment	of	not	less	than	8	years	on	
a	 person	 guilty	 of	 an	 offence	 under	 section	 25A(2).	 Any	 non‐parole	 period	 for	 the	
sentence	is	also	required	to	be	not	less	than	8	years	[emphasis	added].			
	
This	reference	to	the	minimum	NPP	was	recommended	by	the	Attorney‐General	in	Parliament	
to	make	it	clear	that	a	court	is	required	to	set	a	NPP	of	eight	years	and	not	lower	in	respect	of	the	
s	 25A(2)	 offence,	 presumably	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 8‐year	 mandatory	 minimum	 could	 not	 be	
interpreted	as	a	head	sentence	(Smith	2014).	However,	when	this	NPP	period	is	read	alongside	s	
44(1)	and	 (2)	of	 the	Crimes	 (Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	 (NSW),	 the	head	sentence	 for	 an	
offender	 for	 a	 s	 25A(2)	 offence	 will	 need	 to	 be	 one‐third	 more	 than	 the	 8‐year	 mandatory	
minimum.	 This	 is	 because,	 unless	 the	 court	 is	 imposing	 an	 ‘aggregate	 sentence’,12	 s	 44(1)	
requires	the	court	to	‘first	set	a	non‐parole	period	for	the	sentence	(that	is,	the	minimum	period	
for	which	the	offender	must	be	kept	in	detention	in	relation	to	the	offence)’	and	s	44(2)	requires	
that	‘the	balance	of	the	term	of	the	sentence	must	not	exceed	one‐third	of	the	non‐parole	period	
for	the	sentence,	unless	the	court	decides	that	there	are	special	circumstances	for	it	being	more	
(in	which	case	the	court	must	make	a	record	of	 its	reasons	 for	 that	decision).’	 In	other	words,	
where	a	court	is	not	imposing	an	aggregate	sentence	(and	does	not	find	‘special	circumstances’),	
a	head	sentence	for	the	least	serious	s	25A(2)	offence	would	be	just	over	10.5	years.	In	effect,	the	
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new	legislation	mandates	that	fatal	assaults	where	the	offender	is	intoxicated	are	necessarily	at	
the	 above‐average	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum	 for	manslaughter	 sentences.	 This	 is	 both	 inconsistent	
with	s	25A’s	 location	on	the	third	tier	 in	the	hierarchy	of	 fatality	crimes	(beneath	murder	and	
manslaughter)	 and	 out	 of	 line	 with	 previous	 sentencing	 practice,	 particularly	 for	 one‐punch	
fatality	 cases.	 It	 does,	 however,	 accord	 with	 the	 Government’s	 stated	 objective	 of	 punishing	
severely	 violent	 offences	 committed	 in	 circumstances	 where	 the	 offender	 is	 intoxicated.	 As	
Premier	O’Farrell	made	clear	in	the	second	reading	speech:	
	
It	 is	 unacceptable	 to	 think	 it	 is	 okay	 to	go	 out,	 get	 intoxicated,	 start	 a	 fight	 and	
throw	a	punch.	This	legislation	means	that	people	will	face	serious	consequences	
…	.	(O’Farrell	2014b:	6)	
	
It	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 how	 the	 mandatory	 minimum	 for	 s	 25A(2)	 offences	 may	 impact	 on	
sentencing	 practices	 for	 manslaughter.	 For	 example,	 will	 it	 produce	 the	 unintended	
consequence	of	inflating	sentences	for	fatalities	that	do	not	fall	within	the	scope	of	s	25A(1)	or	
(2)	as	judges	feel	compelled	to	maintain	the	integrity	of	the	culpability	hierarchy	which	locates	
manslaughter	above	assault	causing	death?	
	
While	 s	25A(2)	may	be	out	of	 line	with	 the	culpability	hierarchy	and	sentencing	practices	 for	
manslaughter,	 it	 may	 not	 be	 out	 of	 line	 with	 Parliament’s	 provision	 of	 standard	 non‐parole	
periods	(SNPP)	(Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW)	s	54A(2)).	The	SNPP	represents	
the	 non‐parole	 period	 for	 an	 offence	 ‘in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 range	 of	 seriousness’	 ‘taking	 into	
account	 only	 the	 objective	 factors	 affecting	 the	 relative	 seriousness	 of	 that	 offence’	 (Crimes	
(Sentencing	 Procedure)	 Act	 1999	 s	 54A(2)).	 While	 Parliament	 has	 not	 provided	 a	 SNPP	 for	
manslaughter,	it	has	for	other	relevant	crimes	in	the	culpability	hierarchy.	For	example,	murder	
has	a	SNPP	of	25	years	for	special	classes	of	victims	(including	emergency	service	workers	and	
children	 under	 18	 years)	 and	 20	 years	 in	 all	 other	 cases;	 s	 33	 of	 the	Crimes	Act	1900	 (NSW)	
(wounding	with	 intent	 to	do	bodily	harm	or	 resist	arrest)	has	a	SNPP	of	7	years;	 and	s	35(2)	
(reckless	causing	of	GBH)	has	a	SNPP	of	4	years	(Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	(NSW)	
s	54A(2)).	
	
While	the	SNPP	does	not	take	account	of	the	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors	and	any	other	
matters	permitted	 to	be	 taken	 into	account,	 arguably	 the	 SNPP	assigned	 to	offences	positions	
them	in	the	culpability	hierarchy,	with	the	SNPP	for	each	of	the	assaults	(ss	33	and	35)	ranging	
from	4	to	7	years.	While	 the	two	concepts	(SNPP	and	mandatory	minimum)	are	not	 the	same,	
the	mandatory	minimum	NPP	 for	 s	 25A(2)	 offences	 places	 the	 aggravated	 offence	 above	 the	
SNPP	for	s	35(2)	offences	(4	years)	and	 just	above	that	 for	s	33	offences	(7	years)	–	which,	 in	
terms	of	offence	hierarchy,	is	where	one	would	expect	the	s	25A(2)	offence	to	be.		
	
On	26	February	2014	Premier	O’Farrell	revised	the	original	nine	offences	to	which	mandatory	
minimums	would	apply	when	committed	in	the	circumstances	of	intoxication,	to	six13	(that	is,	in	
addition	to	the	new	crime	of	assault	causing	death):	see	Crimes	Amendment	(Intoxication)	Bill	
2014	(the	Bill).	In	addition,	the	Bill	introduces	a	staggering	five	new	offences	if	committed	when	
‘intoxicated	 in	 public’	 (discussed	 in	 the	 final	 section	 of	 the	 article),	 none	 of	 which	 have	
mandatory	minimums.	These	five	new	offences	are	indicated	in	Table	1.	Table	1	also	sets	out	the	
Government’s	 planned	 likely	 increase	 in	 maximum	 penalties	 for	 the	 aggravated	 versions	 of	
those	offences	relative	 to	 the	maximum	penalty	 for	 the	 ‘basic	offence’;	 the	mooted	mandatory	
minimum	for	the	aggravated	offence;	and	the	current	SNPP	for	each	of	the	‘basic	offences’	(that	
is,	the	current	SNPP	for	the	basic	offence);	and	the	new	offences	(see	the	Bill;	O’Farrell	2014c).	
What	 Table	 1	 suggests	 is	 that	 little	 consideration	 has	 been	 given	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 seriousness	
hierarchy	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	mandatory	minimums	 and	 the	 SNPPs	 for	 the	 basic	
offence.	As	Table	1	 indicates,	 in	most	 circumstances	 the	mooted	mandatory	minimum	 for	 the	
aggravated	 offence	 is	 equivalent	 to	 the	 SNPP	 for	 the	 basic	 offence	 (where	 there	 is	 a	 SNPP).	
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However,	there	appears	to	be	confusion	in	respect	of	the	aggravated	versions	of	ss	60(3A)	and	
(3)	 offences.	While	 the	 aggravated	 version	 of	 a	 s	 60(3A)	 offence	 (to	 become	 s	 60(3C))	 has	 a	
maximum	penalty	 two	years	more	 than	 the	aggravated	s	60(3)	offence	 (to	become	s	60(3B)),	
they	have	been	allocated	the	same	mandatory	minimum	of	5	years:	see	the	Bill	Sch	1	cl	[25].	
	
Table	1:	Comparison	of	basic	and	aggravated	offences	
	
	
	
	
Offence	
Current	
maximum	
for	‘basic	
offence’	
Predicted	new		
maximim	for	
aggrevated	
intoxicated	
offence	
New	
mandatory	
minimum	for	
aggravated	
offence	
	
Standard	non‐
parole	periods	
for	basic	
offence	
	
Murder	police	officer	in	execution	
of	duties,	ss	18,	19B	
Life	 Life14	
25	(special	
class	of	victim/	
victim	under	
18	years)	
	
Murder,	ss	18,	19A	 Life	 ‐	 ‐	
20	(all	other	
cases)	
Manslaughter,	ss	18,	24	 25 ‐ ‐ ‐	
Aggravated	assault	causing	death,	
s	25A(2)	 25	 ‐	 8	
	
‐	
Assault	causing	death,	s	25A(1)	 20 ‐ ‐ 	
Reckless	GBH	–	in	company,	s	
35(1)	and	when	intoxicated	s	
35(1AA)	
14	 16	 5	
	
5	
Assault	police	officer	– reckless	
GBH	or	wounding	(public	
disorder),	s	60(3A)	and	when	
intoxicated	s	60(3C)	
14	 16	 5	
	
‐	
Assault	police	officer	– reckless	
GBH	or	wounding	(not	during	
public	disorder),	s	60(3)	and	when	
intoxicated	s	60(3B)	
12	 14	 5	
	
5	
Reckless	GBH,	35(2)	and	when	
intoxicated	s	35(1A)	 10	 12	 4	
	
4	
Reckless	wounding	in	company,	s	
35(3)	and	when	intoxicated	s	
35(2A)	
10	 12	 4	
	
4	
Affray	s	93C(1)	and	when	
intoxicated	s	93C(1A)	 10	 *12	 ‐	
	
Reckless	wounding,	s	35(4)	and	
when	intoxicated	s	35(3A)	 7	 9	 3	
	
3	
Assault	when	in	company,	s	59(2)	
and	when	intoxicated	s	59(3)	 7	 *9	 ‐	
	
Assault	police	officer	– when	
intoxicated	occasions	ABH	s	
60(2B)	
‐	
	
*9	 ‐	
	
Assault	police	officer	– when	
intoxicated	but	no	ABH	s	60(1B)	 ‐	 *7	 ‐	
	
Assault	occasioning	ABH,	s	59(1)	
and	new	offence	when	intoxicated	
s	35(1A)		
5	 *7	 ‐	
	
*	New	offences	 introduced	 in	2014	Bill	which	may	apply	 if	 committed	when	 ‘intoxicated	 in	public’	 and	
which	do	not	have	a	mandatory	minimum	
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Confusing	and	complex:	The	elements	of	s	25A	
The	fourth	criticism	of	the	Act	is	that	s	25A	has	been	drafted	in	a	complex	and	confusing	way.	
While	an	offence	entitled	 ‘Assault	causing	death’	could	 carve	out	a	 legitimate	space	 for	a	 third	
tier	 of	 fatality	 offences,	 it	 should	 in	 substance	 accord	 with	 what	 Ashworth	 described	 as	 fair	
labelling.	Ashworth	explains	that	the	concern	of	fair	labelling:	
	
…	is	to	see	that	widely	felt	distinctions	between	kinds	of	offences	and	degrees	of	
wrongdoing	 are	 respected	 and	 signalled	 by	 the	 law,	 and	 that	 offences	 are	
subdivided	and	labelled	so	as	to	represent	fairly	the	nature	and	magnitude	of	the	
law‐breaking.	(Ashworth	2009:	78;	see	also	Chalmers	and	Leverick	2008)	
	
The	 peculiar	 way	 in	 which	 s	 25A	 has	 been	 drafted	 means	 that	 the	 offence	 created	 fails	 the	
principles	 of	 fair	 labelling	 and	 creates	 a	 further	 lack	 of	 coherence	 in	 the	 criminal	 law.	 These	
issues	 are	 exemplified	 in	 the	 basic	 offence	 which	 has	 defined	 the	 conduct	 in	 ways	 that	 are	
arbitrary	and	lack	clarity.	As	will	be	discussed	in	the	final	section	of	the	article,	the	aggravated	
version	 has	 also	 been	 drafted	 without	 sufficient	 precision	 as	 to	 the	 aggravating	 factor	 of	
intoxication.	 Both	 are	 problems	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 result	 in	 operational	 difficulty	 and	 will	 be	
discussed	in	turn.	
	
The	basic	offence	
For	the	basic	offence	under	s	25A(1),	the	prosecution	must	prove	beyond	reasonable	doubt	the	
following	elements:	
	
1. an	assault	‘by	intentionally	hitting’	the	other	person	with	any	part	of	the	person’s	body	
or	with	an	object	held	by	the	person;	
2. that	the	assault	was	not	authorised	or	excused	by	law;15	and	
3. that	 the	 assault	 causes	 the	 death	 of	 the	 other	 person,	 where	 ‘causes’	 is	 defined	 in	 s	
25A(3).	
	
The	 focus	of	this	discussion	will	be	 in	relation	to	element	one.	 It	 is	noted,	however,	 that	while	
element	 two	 does	 not	 present	 legal	 issues,	 element	 three	may	 have	 unintentionally	 confined	
what	 ‘causes	 the	 death	 of	 the	 other	 person’,	 making	 the	 provision	 inapplicable	 in	 certain	
circumstances.	Thus,	s	25A(3)	states	that:	
	
For	the	purposes	of	this	section	[emphasis	added],	an	assault	causes	the	death	of	a	
person	whether	 the	person	 is	 killed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 injuries	 received	directly	
from	the	assault	or	from	hitting	the	ground	or	an	object	as	a	consequence	of	the	
assault.		
	
This	definition	of	‘causes’	is	problematic	as	it	may	be	that	neither	the	injury	resulting	from	the	
assault	 nor	 the	 hitting	 of	 the	 ground	 or	 object	 causes	 the	 death.	 This	 has	 been	 the	 case	 in	 a	
number	of	matters	notably	where	the	victim	suffered	a	defect	or	where,	 following	the	assault,	
the	victim	died	from	another	cause	such	as	drowning.16	While	it	has	been	the	policy	of	the	law	to	
take	your	victim	as	you	find	him/her	(Blaue	[1975]	3	All	ER	446,	450)	(sometimes	known	as	the	
‘egg	shell	skull	rule’)	and	so	the	victim’s	defect	would	not	affect	causation,	the	fact	that	s	25A(3)	
states	 ‘[f]or	 the	purposes	of	 this	section’	may	suggest	a	 legislative	 intention	 to	define	causation	
for	 this	 section	 and	 so	 oust	 the	 common	 law	 rule,	 effectively	 removing	 such	 deaths	 from	 the	
operation	 of	 this	 offence.	 This	 problem	 does	 not	 arise	 in	 the	 Western	 Australian	 equivalent	
which	states	‘dies	as	a	direct	or	indirect	result	of	the	assault’	(s	281(1));	it	is	not	clear	why	this	
definition	 of	 ‘causes’	 in	 the	 NSW	 offence	 was	 proffered	 but	 I	 suggest	 it	 is	 tied	 up	 with	 the	
particularities	of		Mr	Kelly’s	death.	
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In	 the	 lead	 up	 to	 announcing	 the	 assault	 causing	 death	 offence	 (discussed	 above),	 the	 NSW	
Government	 indicated	 it	 would	 be	 modelled	 on	 the	 Western	 Australian	 equivalent	 (that	 is,	
Criminal	Code	1913	 s	 281).	 The	NSW	 offence,	 however,	 departs	 in	 significant	ways	 from	 that	
model	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 ‘cause	 the	 death’	 is	 defined	 and,	 as	will	 be	 discussed	 below,	 the	
types	of	conduct	that	may	constitute	an	‘assault’	for	the	offence.	Indeed,	it	would	appear	that	the	
circumstances	of	Mr	Kelly’s	tragic	death	in	all	their	particularity	–	a	blow	to	the	head	which	led	
him	 to	 fall	 to	 the	ground	and	hit	his	head	on	 the	 footpath	and	 suffer	massive	brain	 injuries	–	
have	exerted	a	greater	 influence	on	 the	wording	of	s	25A	 than	the	Western	Australian	 law	on	
which	it	was	ostensibly	modelled.	Perhaps	there	was	a	desire	to	accurately	capture	and	embed	
in	 legislation	 the	precise	wrong	done	 to	Mr	Kelly,	 as	a	symbolic	gesture	of	 recognition	of	 that	
specific	 tragedy.	While	explicable	 in	 those	 terms,	 it	 is	not	a	 sound	basis	 for	a	major	change	 to	
NSW	 homicide	 law.	 The	 chief	 problem	 is	 that	 the	 idiosyncratic	 definition	 of	 assault	 causing	
death	 (discussed	 below)	 which	 has	 been	 adopted	 in	 NSW	 risks	 excluding	 killings	 that	 are	
equally	tragic,	and	where	the	offender	is	just	as	culpable,	but	the	death	occurs	in	circumstances	
which	do	not	fit	within	the	frame	created	by	s	25A.		
	
Arbitrarily	confining	the	conduct	to	‘hitting’	
Under	 the	 Western	 Australian	 provision	 any	 form	 of	 unlawful	 assault	 that	 either	 directly	 or	
indirectly	 causes	 the	 person’s	 death	 satisfies	 the	 offence.	 The	 NSW	 provision	 confines	 the	
‘assault’	element	to	‘intentionally	hitting	the	other	person	with	any	part	of	the	person’s	body	or	
with	an	object	held	by	the	person’.	 It	 is	unclear	where	the	model	 for	this	aspect	of	the	offence	
came	from	although	I	suggest	it	is	based	on	the	particular	circumstances	of	Mr	Kelly’s	death	(and	
possibly	also	Mr	Christie’s).	The	offence	is	closer	to,	but	not	the	same	as,	the	Northern	Territory	
(NT)	provision	which	is	based	on	a	‘violent	act’	causing	death	(rather	than	simply	an	assault)	in	
s	 161A	 Criminal	 Code	 (NT).	 The	 Northern	 Territory	 provision	 defines	 ‘conduct	 involving	 a	
violent	act’	in	s	161A(5);	however,	there	is	no	similar	definition	of	the	word	‘hitting’	in	the	NSW	
provision17	or	elsewhere	in	the	Crimes	Act	1900.	It	is	also	not	a	word	used	in	any	other	section	of	
the	Crimes	Act	190018	and	I	have	not	located	any	judicial	consideration	of	that	phrase.		
	
As	a	matter	of	 statutory	construction,	 regard	may	be	had	 to	extrinsic	material	 to	confirm	that	
the	ordinary	meaning	is	the	meaning	to	be	conveyed	by	the	text	(Interpretation	Act	1987	(NSW)	
s	34(1)(a)).	The	ordinary	or	common	meaning	of	the	word	in	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary	is:	
	
Hitting,	n.	–	The	action	of	hit	v.	in	various	senses;	striking,	impact,	collision	
Hitting,	adj.	–	That	hits	or	strikes;	striking		
Hit,	v.	–	I.	To	get	at	or	reach	with	a	blow,	to	strike.19	
	
The	 second	 reading	 speech	 may	 be	 used	 to	 confirm	 this	 meaning	 (Interpretation	 Act	 1987	 s	
34(2)(f))	and	that	speech	indicates	that	the	Act	was	modelled	on	the	‘one	punch’	scenario:		
	
The	 Crimes	 and	 Other	 Legislation	 Amendment	 (Assault	 and	 Intoxication)	 Bill	
2014	introduces	a	new	offence	for	one‐punch	assaults	[emphasis	added]	where	a	
person	unlawfully	assaults	another	who	dies	as	a	result	of	the	assault,	with	a	20‐
year	 maximum	 sentence	 being	 introduced.	 Perpetrators	 of	 one‐punch	 killings	
[emphasis	 added]	 have	 previously	 been	 prosecuted	 in	 New	 South	 Wales	 for	
manslaughter.	This	means	that	when	the	case	goes	to	court	the	prosecution	has	to	
prove	beyond	reasonable	doubt	 that	 the	offender	 should	have	 foreseen	 that,	by	
doing	what	 he	 or	 she	 did,	 the	 victim	would	 be	 placed	 at	 risk	 of	 serious	 injury.	
(O’Farrell	2014b:	3)	
	
This	would	 suggest	 a	 fairly	 narrow	 focus	 but	 confirms	 the	 ordinary	meaning	 of	 ‘hitting’	 as	 a	
striking	or	blow;	 the	 fact	 that	 the	hit	 can	be	by	any	part	of	 the	body	or	 an	object	held	by	 the	
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person,	focuses	on	hits	but	clearly	expands	the	ambit	beyond	that	of	simply	a	single	punch.	The	
question	then	is	what	types	of	behaviour	are	included	or	excluded	by	it?		
	
It	 is	 likely	 to	be	some	time	before	 there	 is	any	 judicial	consideration	of	 the	word	 in	s	25A(1);	
however,	reference	to	NSW	unlawful	and	dangerous	act	manslaughter	cases	–	typically	based	on	
assaults	–	may	highlight	some	of	the	issues.		
	
To	this	end,	the	author	has	reviewed	the	229	unlawful	and	dangerous	act	manslaughter	cases	in	
NSW	from	1998‐2013	by	reference	to	the	Public	Defender’s	Office	of	NSW	Sentencing	Table	for	
that	 offence.20	 Table	 2	 shows	 the	 most	 common	 ‘categories’	 of	 unlawful	 and	 dangerous	 act	
manslaughter	were	assault	 (40.6	per	cent	or,	 together	with	one‐punch	assaults,	48.5	per	cent,	
including	both	general	and	domestic	assaults),	followed	by	stabbings	(which	comprise	30.6	per	
cent)	 and	 shootings	 (12.7	 per	 cent).	 One‐punch	manslaughters	made	 up	 only	 7.9	 per	 cent,	 a	
small	share	of	such	matters.	Note	that	domestic	unlawful	and	dangerous	act	manslaughters	(a	
combination	of	assaults,	stabbings	and	shootings)	account	for	34.9	per	cent	of	all	cases.	
	
Table	2:	Types	of	unlawful	and	dangerous	act	manslaughter	cases	in	NSW,	1998‐2013	
Type	 Number Percentage
Assault	
(Domestic)	
93	
(41)	
40.6
(17.9)	
Stabbing	
(Domestic)	
70	
(31)	
30.6
(13.5)	
Shooting	
(Domestic)	
29	
(8)	
12.7
(3.5)	
One	punch	 18	 7.9
Motor	vehicle	 8	 3.5
Arson	 5	 2.2
Other	 4	 1.8
Drowning	 2	 0.9
Total	
(Domestic)	
229
80	
100
34.9	
	
At	 law	a	shooting	(Ryan	v	R	 (1967)	121	CLR	205)	and	a	stabbing	amount	 to	assaults	 (in	their	
aggravated	 forms);	 however,	 typically	 they	 are	 categorised	 separately	 as	 (more	 serious)	
‘categories’	 of	 unlawful	 and	 dangerous	 act	 manslaughter.	 Such	 matters	 could	 be	 prosecuted	
under	the	Western	Australian	unlawful	assault	causing	death	offence	as	all	that	is	required	is	an	
assault	causing	death.	One	criticism	of	the	Western	Australian	provision	(which	may	not	apply	
to	the	NSW	offence)	is	that	the	breadth	of	the	conduct	that	can	come	within	the	offence	has	led	
to	very	serious	deaths	in	Western	Australia	being	prosecuted	under	it	(see	Quilter	2014b).	It	is	
unlikely	that	a	shooting	or	stabbing	would	satisfy	a	 ‘hitting	 the	other	person	…	with	an	object	
held	by	the	person’	under	s	25A(1).	It	is	possible	that	the	latter	(a	stabbing)	may,	but	a	creative	
legal	argument	would	need	to	be	constructed	to	show	that	a	‘stab’	constitutes	a	‘hitting’	and	this	
may	 depend	 on	 the	way	 the	 knife	 or	 other	 object	was	 used.	 For	 instance,	was	 it	 applied	 in	 a	
stabbing	action	more	akin	to	a	hitting	or	was	it	 ‘pushed’	or	 forced?	The	former	(a	shooting)	 is	
unlikely	to	constitute	a	hitting	because	the	hit	that	causes	the	death	comes	from	the	bullet,	not	
by	 an	 object	 held	 by	 the	 person.	 This	 means	 that	 perhaps	 appropriately	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
seriousness	hierarchy	and	the	principles	of	 fair	 labelling,	stabbings	and	shootings	(being	more	
than	40	per	cent	of	 the	more	serious	cases	currently	prosecuted	as	manslaughter	by	unlawful	
and	 dangerous	 act)	 are	 ruled	 out	 of	 the	 ambit	 of	 s	 25A	 offences,	 including	 the	 aggravated	
offence.		
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If	we	look	further	at	the	cases	in	relation	to	‘assaults’,	the	most	significant	category	in	Table	2	of	
unlawful	and	dangerous	act	manslaughter	(48.5	per	cent,	when	one‐punch	manslaughter	cases	
are	 included),	 the	 case	 law	 suggests	 a	 variety	 of	 behaviours	 constitute	 such	 assaults.	 The	
following	words	are	applied	in	the	cases	to	describe	how	the	assault	occurred:	brawl	(Annakin	
(1988)	37	A	Crim	R	131);	group	assault	 (Avakian	 [2003]	NSWSC	1042);	assault	 (Kwon	 [2004]	
NSWCCA	 456;	 Esposito	 [2006]	 NSWSC	 1454);	 stomping	 	 (Willoughby	 [2001]	 NSWSC	 1015);	
bashing	 (TJP	 [1999]	 NSWCCA	 408);	 striking	 (Hyatt	 [2000]	 NSWSC	 774;	 Grenenger	 [1999]	
NSWSC	380);	beating	(Sotheren	[2001]	NSWSC	214);	ramming	(Woodland	[2001]	NSWSC	416);	
hitting	 (with	 an	object)	 (Benbow	 [2009]	NSWSC	1472;	Leung	 [2013]	NSWSC	259);	one‐punch	
(eg	 R	 v	 Risteski	 [1999]	 NSWSC	 1248);	 kicking	 (Bellamy	 [2000]	 NSWSC	 1217;	 CW	 [2011]	
NSWCCA	45;	DGP	[2010]	NSWSC	1408);	head‐butt	(R	v	CK,	TS	[2007]	NSWSC	1424;	R	v	Carroll	
(2008)	 188	 A	 Crim	 R	 253);	 gouging	 (Tillman	 [2004]	 NSWSC	 794);	 tackling	 (Dean‐Wilcocks	
[2012]	 NSWSC	 107);	 strangling	 (Graham	 [2000]	 NSWSC	 1033);	 suffocated	 (Masson	 [2001]	
NSWSC	 1037);	 asphyxiation	 (Adamson	 (2002)	 132	 A	 Crim	R	 511);	 pushing	 (Wheatley	 [2007]	
NSWSC	 1182;	Zammit	 [2008]	NSWSC	 317);	 forcing	 (MD	 [2005]	NSWCCA	 342;	Daniels	 [2004]	
NSWSC	1201;	Jeffrey	 [2009]	NSWSC	202);	 throwing	(CK	[2004]	NSWCCA	116);	burning	(Byrne	
[2001]	NSWSC	1164);	bruising	(Byrne	[2001]	NSWSC	1164);	shaking	(GJL	[2009]	NSWDC	167);	
and	drowning	(Laing	[2004]	NSWSC	510).	
	
While	 the	 case	 law	 indicates	 that	 these	 are	 different	 ways	 of	 carrying	 out	 an	 assault	 for	 the	
purposes	of	unlawful	and	dangerous	act	manslaughter,	arguably	only	some	will	meet	the	criteria	
in	s	25A.	On	the	one	hand,	brawls,	stomping,	bashing,	striking,	kicking,	beating	and	head‐butts	
are	likely	to	meet	the	criteria	of	an	‘intentional	hitting’	of	the	person	by	any	part	of	the	person’s	
body.	On	the	other	hand,	an	assault	that	occurs	by	way	of	gouging,	pushing,	 forcing,	 throwing,	
tackling,21	strangling,	asphyxiation,	burning,	shaking	and	drowning,	are	unlikely	to.	There	does	
not	appear	to	be	any	principled	basis	for	these	distinctions	–	and	certainly	not	in	terms	of	where	
they	sit	on	the	scale	of	objective	seriousness.		
	
The	assault	is	also	confined	under	s	25A(1)	to	hitting	by	objects	held	by	the	person.	This	must,	
thereby,	exclude	an	assault	by	‘throwing’	an	object	(such	as	a	rock,	bar	stool,	brick,	beer	bottle	or	
another	object)	at	the	person	and,	if	a	shooting	were	not	excluded	by	the	word	hitting,	it	is	likely	
to	be	excluded	by	the	fact	that	the	victim	is	hit	by	a	bullet	rather	than	the	gun	which	is	held	by	
the	person.	This	criterion	may	not,	however,	exclude	stabbings	as	the	object	would	be	held	by	
the	person.	
	
The	 introduction	 of	 the	 elements	 of	 ‘hitting’	 and	 ‘held	 by	 the	 person’	may	 have	 been	done	 to	
demarcate	certain	forms	of	conduct	(such	as	shootings	and	stabbings)	as	more	serious	than	the	
ambit	 of	 s	 25A	 offences	 –	 and	 hence	 to	 be	 dealt	 with	 by	 way	 of	 murder	 or	 manslaughter.	
However,	it	does	not	explain	why	very	serious	brawls,	bashings	and	group	assaults	may	well	be	
prosecuted	 under	 s	 25A(1)	 with	 the	 lesser	 maximum	 penalty	 for	 the	 basic	 offence,	 whereas	
potentially	less	serious	assaults	causing	death	such	as	pushing	or	tackling	cannot.	Furthermore,	
removing	assaults	that	occur	by	way	of	‘throwing’	from	the	operation	of	s	25A	seems	arbitrary	
rather	than	based	on	any	principle	in	relation	to	offence	seriousness	or	otherwise.	Conversely,	
what	this	means	is	that	assaults	leading	to	death	that	do	not	constitute	‘intentionally	hitting	the	
other	person	with	any	part	of	the	person’s	body	or	with	an	object	held	by	the	person’	will	need	
to	be	prosecuted	as	 either	manslaughter	or	murder,	no	matter	 the	 scale	of	 seriousness	of	 the	
conduct.		
	
These	 aspects	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 s	 25A	 exemplify	 the	 vice	 of	 what	 Horder	 (1994)	 called	
‘particularism’:	 the	 inclusion	of	definitional	detail	 that	merely	exemplifies	rather	than	delimits	
wrongdoing.	The	problem	with	this	approach	is	that:	 ‘[v]ery	precise	specification	of	the	modes	
of	 responsibility	 opens	 up	 the	 possibility	 of	 unmeritorious	 technical	 argument’	 over	 which	
conduct	 falls	 within	 the	 offence	 and	 creates	 ‘arbitrary	 distinctions	 between	 [that	 conduct]	
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included	and	those	left	out’	(Horder	1994:	340;	see	also	Loughnan	2010:	20‐1).	In	turn,	this	has	
the	potential	to	undermine	the	communicative	function	of	the	criminal	law	(Duff	2000,	1999).	It	
is	likely	that	in	any	prosecution	under	s	25A,	technical	arguments	will	be	made	about	what	types	
of	conduct	do	(not)	fit	within	the	offence	with	potentially	unintended	consequences.	
	
There	 are	 three	 other	ways	 that	 the	 drafting	 of	 this	 element	 potentially	 excludes	 less	 serious	
forms	of	assaults	from	the	parameters	of	s	25A,	which	will	be	discussed	in	turn.	Once	again	these	
raise	questions	about	hierarchy,	fair	labelling	and	how	these	reforms	create	a	lack	of	cohesion	in	
the	criminal	law.	
	
First,	 by	 confining	 assaults	 to	 ‘hittings’	 the	 NSW	 offence	 excludes	 the	 common	 law	 form	 of	
‘assault’	 from	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	 actus	 reus.	 In	 NSW	 the	 common	 law	 contained	 two	 separate	
offences	being	assault	(the	threat	of	unlawful	physical	contact)	and	battery	(the	actual	infliction	
of	 unlawful	 physical	 contact).	 These	 are	 now	 combined	 in	 the	 Crimes	Act	1900	 (NSW)	 in	 the	
offence	of	‘common	assault’	in	s	61.	The	offence	in	s	25A	is	restricted	to	‘assaults’	based	on	the	
old	form	of	‘battery’	because	there	must	be	an	assault	by	hitting	the	other	person	either	with	a	
part	 of	 the	 body	 or	 an	 object	 held	 by	 the	 person.	 This	 means	 that	 ‘assaults’	 which	 involve	
creating	the	apprehension	of	imminent	unlawful	physical	contact	which	lead	to	a	person’s	death	
are	excluded	from	the	operation	of	s	25A.	For	example,	the	conduct	in	R	v	Kerr	[2004]	NSWSC	75	
(Kirby	 J,	24	February	2004)	could	not	be	prosecuted	under	s	25A.	 In	 that	matter	 the	offender	
alighted	 from	 a	 train	 and,	 in	 an	 aggressive	manner	 and	 swearing,	 approached	 a	 male	 sitting	
alone	on	a	platform.	The	assault	led	the	victim	to	jump	onto	the	tracks	where	he	was	struck	by	a	
train.	The	offender	was	convicted	of	manslaughter	by	unlawful	and	dangerous	act	(see	also	RIK	
[2004]	NSWCCA	282).	Indeed,	most	‘escape’	cases	may	not	come	within	the	parameters	of	s	25A.	
Consider	the	facts	in	one	version	of	the	Crown	case	in	Royall,	where	Healey	had	a	well‐founded	
and	reasonable	apprehension	that,	if	she	remained	in	the	bathroom,	she	would	be	subjected	to	
life	 threatening	 violence	 from	 Royall,	 and	 so	 she	 jumped	 out	 of	 the	 window	 to	 escape	 and	
thereby	 died	 (Royall	 (1991)	 172	 CLR	 378).	 Such	 ‘psychic’	 assaults	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	
operation	 of	 s	 25A(1);	 yet	 arguably	 they	may	 represent	 a	 less	 serious	 form	 of	 assault	 to	 the	
actual	infliction	of	unlawful	physical	contact	and	to	that	extent	may	be	better	suited	–	in	terms	of	
hierarchy	of	offence	seriousness	as	discussed	above	–	 to	an	offence	with	a	 lower	maximum	to	
that	of	manslaughter.		
	
Secondly,	assaults	under	s	25A	are	also	confined	to	assaults	that	 involve	 ‘intentionally	hitting’,	
presumably	with	the	aim	of	removing	assaults	that	occur	‘by	accident’	(for	example,	jostling	in	a	
queue	to	get	 into	a	nightclub	or	at	a	crowded	bar)	 from	the	ambit	of	 the	offence.	This	has	 the	
implication	of	ruling	out	assaults	that	occur	recklessly.	Thus,	the	mens	rea	for	an	assault	is	either	
intent	 or	 recklessness:	 an	 intent	 to	 effect	 unlawful	 contact	 or	 create	 the	 apprehension	 of	
imminent	unlawful	contact;	or	being	reckless	as	to	whether	his/her	actions	would	effect	unlawful	
contact	or	create	the	apprehension	of	 imminent	unlawful	contact	–	where	recklessness	means	
foresight	of	the	possibility	(MacPherson	v	Brown	(1975)	12	SASR	184).	It	is	unclear	as	to	why	the	
legislature	has	precluded	 ‘hitting’	 that	occurs	recklessly	from	the	scope	of	s	25A	(for	example,	
where	a	person	swings	a	faux	punch	that	lands	because	the	accused	trips	or	staggers	as	s/he	is	
swinging).	 Such	 assaults	 are,	 in	 theory,	 not	 precluded	 from	 the	 more	 serious	 offence	 of	
manslaughter	by	unlawful	and	dangerous	act.		
	
Thirdly,	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 assault	 occurs	 by	 intentionally	 hitting	 the	other	person	may	
also	rule	out	situations	where	the	offender	intends	to	hit	one	person	but	in	fact	hits	another.	For	
example,	this	is	what	occurred	in	the	case	of	Taiseni,	Motuapuaka,	Leota,	Tuifua	[2007]	NSWSC	
1090.	In	that	case,	Leota	was	involved	in	an	argument	with	the	second	victim	over	the	use	of	a	
pool	table	and	was	ejected	 from	the	hotel	but	returned	with	his	co‐offenders	and	attacked	the	
second	victim.	Motuapuaka	swung	a	bar	stool	at	the	second	victim	but	it	fatally	struck	the	first	
victim	(a	hotel	employee)	in	the	head	(when	the	second	victim	ducked).	The	offenders	pleaded	
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guilty	 to	 unlawful	 and	 dangerous	 act	manslaughter.	While	 such	 a	 situation	 is	 covered	 by	 the	
Western	 Australian	 provision	 (and	 in	 the	 Northern	 Territory,	 s	 161A(1)(b)(ii)	 ‘or	 any	 other	
person’),	such	conduct	is	likely	to	be	excluded	from	the	parameters	of	s	25A	offences.	Again,	on	
one	view,	such	conduct	 is	 less	serious	than	that	concerned	with	 intentionally	hitting	the	other	
person	 and	 may	 be	 more	 appropriately	 dealt	 with	 under	 the	 basic	 offence	 with	 a	 lower	
maximum	penalty	of	20	years	rather	than	under	manslaughter.	Furthermore,	the	drafting	of	the	
offence	as	‘intentionally	hitting	the	other	person’	appears	to	have	excluded	the	general	common	
law	doctrine	of	 transferred	malice	by	expressly	 requiring	 that	 the	 intent	 to	hit	be	attached	 to	
‘the	other	person’	(not	any	person).22	
	
The	role	of	intoxication:	Legally	and	operationally	problematic	
The	 fifth	 criticism	 of	 the	 legislation	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 clarity	 and	 operational	 constraints	 that	
surround	the	definition	of	 ‘intoxication’.	Before	turning	to	this	issue,	there	is	a	 larger	question	
that	 is	 thrown	 into	 relief	by	 the	 addition	of	 s	25A(2)	 into	NSW	criminal	 law:	 is	a	person	who	
commits	 the	 offence	 of	 assault	 causing	 death	while	 intoxicated	more	morally	 culpable	 than	 a	
person	who	does	so	while	stone	cold	sober?	The	NSW	Government’s	position	 is	unequivocally	
‘yes’.	This	normative	position	is	controversial	but	so,	I	would	argue,	is	the	‘common	sense’	view	
(which	 routinely	 features	 in	 defence	 sentencing	 submissions)	 that	 violence	 can	 be	 rendered	
explicable	because	the	offender	was	drunk,	or	that	intoxicated	violence	is	less	morally	culpable	
(see	also	Loughnan	2012).	Indeed,	there	is	an	important	debate	to	be	had	about	whether	or	not	
‘intoxication’	 is	an	appropriate	basis	 for	distinguishing	between	more	serious	and	 less	serious	
forms	of	criminal	conduct	in	the	context	of	offences	of	violence.		
	
It	 is	 worth	 recognising	 that	 intoxication	 already	 renders	 conduct	 more	 culpable	 in	 some	
contexts,	 including	driving	 offences.	Moreover,	 this	 is	 an	 approach	 that	 has	 strong	 support	 in	
tohe	wider	community.	For	instance,	a	distinction	applies	in	the	driving	context	with	the	offence	
of	dangerous	driving	occasioning	death	(s	52A)	and	 its	aggravated	 form	(s	52A(2))	one	of	 the	
aggravating	 circumstances	 being	 driving	 with	 the	 ‘prescribed	 concentration	 of	 alcohol’	 (s	
52A(7)),	defined	in	s	52A(9):	
	
prescribed	concentration	of	alcohol	means	a	concentration	of	0.15	grammes	or	
more	of	alcohol	in	210	litres	of	breath	or	100	millilitres	of	blood.	
	
The	 principled	 basis	 for	 introducing	 random	 breath‐testing	 and	 other	 drink‐driving	 related	
offences	 such	 as	 aggravated	 dangerous	 driving	 is	 found	 in	 studies	 that	 demonstrate	 the	
relationship	between	drinking	and	impaired	(risky)	driving.23	Yet	studies	have	also	repeatedly	
demonstrated	the	link	between	alcohol,	violence	and	a	myriad	of	societal	harms	(including	that	
alcohol	 increases	 risks).24	 The	 analogy	may	 be	 imperfect,	 but	 if	 we	 see	 one‐punch	 deaths	 as	
somewhat	 analogous	 to	 drink‐driving	 fatalities,	 perhaps	 there	 is	 a	 question	 as	 to	 whether	
intoxication	should	be	seen	as	an	aggravating	factor	for	certain	other	forms	of	violent	conduct.25		
	
Putting	 to	 one	 side	 the	 legitimacy	 or	 otherwise	 of	 distinguishing	 the	 basic	 and	 aggravated	
offences	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 intoxication,	 there	 are	 clear	 legal	 problems	 with	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	
aggravated	 offence	 in	 s	 25A(2),	 particularly	 around	 the	 lack	 of	 clarity	 in	 what	 the	 term	
‘intoxicated’	means.			
	
The	aggravated	offence	requires	the	‘basic	offence’	to	be	committed	by	a	person	over	the	age	of	
18	years	who,	at	the	time	of	committing	the	offence,	was	intoxicated.	However,	the	Act	provides	
limited	guidance	on	what	‘intoxicated’	means	aside	from:	
	
 Intoxication	has	the	same	meaning	as	in	Pt	11A	of	the	Crimes	Act	1900	being	‘intoxication	
because	of	the	influence	of	alcohol,	a	drug	or	any	other	substance’	(s	428A);	
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 that	in	proceedings	for	an	offence	under	s	25A(2),	evidence	regarding	the	concentration	
of	 alcohol,	 drug	 or	 other	 substance	 at	 the	 time	of	 the	 alleged	 offence	may	be	 given	 as	
determined	by	an	analysis	carried	out	under	the	new	Div	4,	Pt	10,	LEPRA	(s	25A(6)(a));	
and	
 	‘the	 accused	 is	 conclusively	 presumed	 to	 be	 intoxicated	by	 alcohol’	 if	 the	 prosecution	
proves	under	an	analysis	carried	out	 in	accordance	with	Div	4,	Pt	10,	 that	 the	accused	
has	a	0.15	grams	or	more	of	alcohol	in	220	litres	of	breath	or	100	millilitres	of	blood	(s	
25A(6)(b))	(being	equivalent	to	the	HRPCA	amount).	
	
In	addition,	the	Premier’s	second	reading	speech	to	the	Act,	stated:		
	
The	 bill	 sets	 out	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 prosecution	 can	 prove	 intoxication.	 An	
accused	 person	 is	 presumed	 intoxicated	 if	 they	 have	more	 than	 0.15	 grams	 or	
more	of	alcohol	in	220	litres	of	breath	or	100	millilitres	of	blood.	Where	this	is	not	
available,	 or	 where	 drugs	 are	 suspected,	 other	 evidence	 may	 be	 considered,	
including	the	concentration	of	alcohol	or	drug	in	a	person’s	breath	or	blood	at	the	
time	of	 the	offence	and	evidence	 from	closed‐circuit	 television	 [CCTV]	 footage,	eye	
witnesses	 and	 police	 observations,	 all	 of	 which	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 current	
provisions	of	the	Crimes	Act	[emphasis	added].	(O’Farrell	2014b:	3)	
	
The	failure	to	define	‘intoxicated’	means	that	one	of	the	significant	difficulties	with	prosecutions	
under	s	25A(2)	 is	 likely	to	be	proving	that,	at	 the	time	the	offence	was	committed,	 the	person	
was	in	fact	intoxicated.	Aside	from	situations	where	a	person	is	‘deemed’	to	be	intoxicated	by	the	
prosecution	 proving,	 via	 an	 analysis	 carried	 out	 under	Div	 4,	 Pt	 10	 of	 LEPRA,	 that	 there	was	
present	in	the	accused’s	breath	or	blood	a	concentration	of	0.15	grams	or	more	of	alcohol	in	220	
litres	of	breath	or	100	millilitres	of	blood	(such	cases	are	 likely	to	be	rare,	 for	 the	operational	
reasons	discussed	below),	the	legislation	leaves	a	significant	‘grey	area’	as	to	what	is	meant	by	
intoxication	 either	 by	 alcohol	 or	 drugs.	 In	 other	words,	where	 the	prosecution	 does	not	 have	
‘conclusive’	evidence	of	intoxication	under	s	25A(6)(b),	it	will	be	a	matter	of	cobbling	together	
evidence	of	eye	witnesses,	police	and	experts.	Furthermore,	with	a	mandatory	8‐year	minimum	
sentence	(s	25B(1))	the	consequence	of	conviction	together	with	the	fact	that	there	is	unlikely	to	
be	any	incentive	to	plead	to	such	offences,	the	defence	will	hotly	contest	this	issue,	putting	the	
Crown	to	strict	proof.	Where	pleas	to	unlawful	and	dangerous	act	manslaughter	typically	lead	to	
an	 ‘agreed	 statement	 of	 facts’	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 sentencing	 including	 acknowledgment	 of	
agreed	levels	of	alcohol	or	drug	consumption,	there	are	unlikely	to	be	any	admissions	made	by	
offenders	in	relation	to	intoxication	for	s	25A(2)	charges.		
	
This	 problem	 does	 not	 arise	 in	 other	 situations	 where	 intoxication	 is	 an	 aggravating	 factor.	
Thus,	 for	 the	 aggravated	 offence	 of	 dangerous	 driving	 occasioning	 death	 in	 s	 52A,	where	 the	
aggravating	 factor	 is	driving	with	the	 ‘prescribed	concentration	of	alcohol’	 (s	52A(7)),	as	cited	
above,	this	has	been	clearly	defined	in	s	52A(9).		
	
The	problem	is	also	not	solved	by	the	mooted	amended	definition	of	‘intoxicated’	in	the	Crimes	
Amendment	 (Intoxication)	 Bill	 2014	 (the	 Bill)	 which,	 if	 passed,	 would	 insert	 a	 definition	 of	
‘intoxicated	in	public’26	into	s	8A(3)	of	the	Crimes	Act	1900	in	the	following	terms:	
	
For	the	purposes	of	an	aggravated	intoxication	offence,	a	person	is	intoxicated	if:		
	
(a) the	person’s	speech,	balance,	co‐ordination	or	behaviour	is	noticeably	affected	as	the	
result	 of	 the	 consumption	 or	 taking	 of	 alcohol	 or	 a	 narcotic	 drug	 (or	 any	 other	
intoxicating	substance	in	conjunction	with	alcohol	or	a	narcotic	drug),	or		
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(b) there	was	present	in	the	person’s	breath	or	blood	the	prescribed	concentration	of	
alcohol	(that	is,	0.15	or	above).		
	
The	Bill	 introducing	 this	definition	was	read	 for	a	second	 time	on	26	February	2014	and	was	
passed	 by	 the	 Legislative	 Assembly	 on	 6	 March	 2014	 without	 amendment.	 If	 passed	 by	 the	
Legislative	Council	 it	will	 apply	 to	 the	 new	assault	 causing	 death	 offence	because	 s	 25A(2)	 is	
defined	 to	be	an	 ‘aggravated	 intoxication	offence’	 in	 s	8A(1)	of	 the	Bill.	 Sub‐section	 (a)	 of	 the	
definition	above	transplants	 the	definition	of	 ‘intoxicated’	 from	provisions	 found	 in	other	Acts	
which	typically	relate	to	a	situation	where	a	police	officer	is	required	to	exercise	a	discretion	as	
to	 whether	 a	 person	 is	 intoxicated	 before	 exercising	 other	 powers	 or	 charging	 an	 offence.	
Section	 9(6)	 of	 the	 Summary	 Offences	 Act	 1988	 (NSW)	 (the	 definition	 of	 intoxication	 for	 the	
offence	 of	 a	 continuation	 of	 intoxicated	 and	 disorderly	 behaviour	 following	 a	 move	 on	
direction),	is	indicative:	
	
(6)	For	the	purposes	of	this	section,	a	person	is	intoxicated	if:		
	
(a) the	person’s	speech,	balance,	co‐ordination	or	behaviour	is	noticeably	affected,	and	
	
(b) it	is	reasonable	in	the	circumstances	to	believe	that	[emphasis	added]	the	affected	
speech,	balance,	co‐ordination	or	behaviour	is	the	result	of	the	consumption	of	
alcohol	or	any	drug.		
	
Similar	definitions	are	contained	in	the	Intoxicated	Persons	(Sobering	Up	Centres	Trial)	Act	2013	
(NSW)	s	4(2);	LEPRA	s	198(5);	and	Liquor	Act	2007	s	5(1).	
	
The	words	‘it	is	reasonable	in	the	circumstances	to	believe	that	…’	have	been	removed	from	the	
mooted	definition	 to	be	applied	 to	 the	s	25A(2)	offence	and	replaced	with	 ‘as	 the	result	of	 the	
consumption	or	taking	of	alcohol	or	a	narcotic	drug	…’.	Such	a	definition	of	 intoxication	will	be	
legally	 and	 operationally	 unworkable	 given	 it	 will	 be	 near	 impossible	 to	 prove	 that	 the	
behaviour	 (that	 is,	 the	 ‘person’s	 speech,	 balance,	 co‐ordination	 or	 behaviour’)	 is	 ‘noticeably	
affected	as	 the	 result	 of	 the	 consumption	 or	 taking	 of’	 alcohol	 or	 drugs.	 In	 other	words,	 how	
could	the	Crown	prove	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	the	‘behaviour’	identified	was	 ‘the	result	
of’	 the	 alcohol	 or	 drugs	 and	 not,	 for	 instance,	 some	 other	 reason	 (for	 example,	 tiredness,	
excitement,	anger,	fear	and	so	on)?	
	
Given	that	over‐consumption	of	alcohol	(and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	other	drugs)	has	been	the	focus	
of	the	construction	of	a	‘problem’	that	needs	to	be	‘fixed’,	it	is	surprising	that	the	new	legislation	
–	and	these	mooted	‘refinements’	–	create	considerable	uncertainty	as	to	where	the	line	will	be	
drawn	between	consumption	of	alcohol/drugs	that	triggers	s	25A(2)	and	consumption	that	does	
not.	The	new	testing	powers	are	also	 likely	 to	be	operationally	difficult	because	of	 the	time	 in	
which	police	have	to	undertake	drug	and	alcohol	testing	under	the	new	Div	4,	Pt	10	of	LEPRA.	In	
the	case	of	alcohol	testing	it	must	be	undertaken	within	two	hours	‘after	the	commission	of	the	
alleged	offences’	(s	138F(3))	‘at	or	near	the	scene	of	the	alleged	offence	or	at	a	police	station	or	
other	 place	 at	 which	 the	 person	 is	 detained	 in	 connection	with	 the	 offence’	 (s	 138F(1)).	 For	
blood	and	urine	samples	for	alcohol	or	drugs	it	must	be	within	four	hours	after	the	commission	
of	 the	 offence	 (s	 138G(3))	 and	 a	 person	may	 be	 taken	 to	 and	 detained	 at	 a	 hospital	 for	 the	
purpose	of	 the	 taking	of	a	blood	or	urine	sample’	 (s	138G(4)).27	Not	only	will	 it	be	difficult	 in	
some	 situations	 to	 define	 exactly	 when	 the	 offence	 was	 committed28	 and	 hence	 when	 time	
begins	 to	 run	 but,	 from	 an	 operational	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 time	 limits	 for	 obtaining	 samples	
dramatically	confine	the	types	of	prosecutions	that	will	be	possible	under	s	25A(2).29		
	
Indeed,	it	is	likely	that	only	offenders	caught	at	the	scene	of	the	crime	will	be	able	to	be	tested	
within	 the	 relevant	 time	 frames.	 For	 instance,	 Mr	 Loveridge	 was	 arrested	 11	 days	 after	 the	
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offence	was	committed	(a	relatively	short	period	of	time	in	investigation	terms	for	a	homicide)	
when	clearly	it	would	not	be	possible	to	test	him	for	alcohol	or	drugs.	If	s	25A(2)	had	been	in	
existence,	the	Crown,	if	it	sought	to	make	out	a	case	for	this	offence,	would	not	have	had	access	
to	 the	 ‘presumptive	conclusion’	of	a	0.15	 test,	and	so	would	have	had	 to	build	evidence	of	Mr	
Loveridge’s	 intoxication.	Evidence	that	he	had	consumed	alcohol	would	not	be	enough.	 In	that	
case,	 it	 appears	 that	 the	 evidence	 of	 Mr	 Loveridge’s	 intoxication	 that	 was	 available	 at	 his	
sentencing	hearing	was	only	available	because	it	had	been	volunteered	by	him	and	formed	part	
of	 an	 agreed	 statement	 of	 facts.30	 Such	 practices	 are	 unlikely	 to	 continue	 with	 a	 mandatory	
minimum	 of	 eight	 years	 being	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 conviction.	 By	 contrast,	 it	 may	 have	 been	
possible	 to	 test	Mr	McNeil,	 in	 relation	 to	 his	 assault	 of	Mr	 Christie,	 because	 he	was	 arrested	
shortly	after	the	assault	and	at	the	scene	of	the	offence.	
	
Not	only	does	this	indicate	the	difficulty	police	will	have	of	carrying	out	drug	and	alcohol	testing	
within	the	relevant	time	frames	of	the	commission	of	the	offence,	but	it	is	also	likely	to	lead	to	an	
ad	hoc	system	for	prosecution	where	it	may	be	purely	chance	that	police	are	able	to	arrest	the	
suspect	and	test	for	alcohol	or	drugs	at	the	scene	of	the	offence.	This	will	introduce	a	significant	
element	of	randomness.	In	one	instance,	an	offender	may	be	charged	with	s	25A(2)	because	the	
offender	 is	 caught	 at	 the	 scene.	 In	 another,	 the	 offender	 is	 not	 caught	 until	 a	week	 later,	 and	
while	s/he	may	still	be	charged	with	s	25A(2),	because	of	difficulties	 in	proving	 ‘intoxication’,	
the	Crown	may	accept	a	plea	to	s	25A(1)	(with	a	20	year	maximum)	–	with	the	result	that	the	
offender	is	entitled	to	the	relevant	discount	for	an	early	guilty	plea.	
	
Given	the	difficulties	in	proving	intoxication	conclusively,	it	is	likely	that	we	will	see	charges	to	s	
25A(2)	 (giving	 the	 appearance	 of	 a	 ‘tough’	 response	 that	 satisfies	 what	 are	 said	 to	 be	 the	
community’s	 expectations)	 but	 pleas	 to	 the	 lesser	 offence	 of	 s	 25A(1).	 Studies	 of	 mandatory	
sentencing	indicate	that	‘discretion’	is	not	removed	from	the	system;	rather	it	is	displaced	often	
onto	police	and	prosecutors,	and	significantly	so	in	the	area	of	charging	and	charge	negotiation	
(Hoel	and	Gelb	2008).	Further	evidence	that	the	acceptance	of	pleas	is	likely	can	be	found	in	the	
study	by	Quilter	(2014b)	of	one‐punch	manslaughters,	which	indicated	that,	in	all	cases	but	one,	
the	matter	did	not	proceed	to	trial,	with	the	offender	pleading	guilty	to	manslaughter.	In	each	of	
the	17	other	cases,	the	offender	received	a	discount	of	20‐25	per	cent	in	recognition	of	the	early	
plea	 (in	accordance	with	Crimes	 (Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	1999	 (NSW)	ss	21A(3)(k),	22	and	
Thomson	and	Houlton	(2000)	49	NSWLR	389).	Furthermore,	 in	10	of	the	matters,	the	offender	
was	 originally	 charged	 with	 murder	 but	 pleaded	 guilty	 to	 the	 less	 serious	 offence	 of	
manslaughter.	 An	 unintended	 consequence	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 basic	 offence	 and	 an	
aggravated	version	(similar	to	the	hierarchy	between	murder	and	manslaughter)	may	mean	that	
we	 could	 see	 charges	 to	 s	 25A(2)	 offences	 but	 pleas	 to	 the	 basic	 offence	 which	 has	 a	 lesser	
maximum	than	manslaughter	and	to	which	no	mandatory	minimum	applies.	The	ultimate	effect	
may	be	a	further	deflation	of	sentences	for	these	types	of	matters.	
	
Conclusion	
This	article	has	made	five	inter‐related	criticisms	of	the	Crimes	and	other	Legislation	Amendment	
(Assault	 and	 Intoxication)	 Act	 2014	 (NSW).	 Although	 the	 NSW	 Government	 claims	 to	 have	
‘listened’	 to	 community	 concerns	 and	 acted	 decisively,	 the	 unfortunate	 irony	 is	 that	 the	
operational	difficulties	 to	which	the	 legislation	will	give	rise	are	 likely	to	result	 in	widespread	
disappointment.	The	 appearance	 of	 a	 tough	 and	 effective	 response	 to	 alcohol‐fuelled	 violence	
may	 turn	 out	 to	 be	 illusory.	 It	 has	 been	 more	 than	 60	 years	 since	 the	 NSW	 Parliament	
substantially	 amended	 homicide	 offences	 in	 the	 Crimes	Act	1900	 (NSW).	 The	 addition	 of	 two	
new	 forms	 of	 homicide	 in	 NSW	 –	 assault	 causing	 death,	 and	 assault	 causing	 death	 while	
intoxicated	–	should	not	have	occurred	in	the	context	of	a	volatile	knee‐jerk	reaction	to	genuine	
community	 anxiety	 about	 alcohol‐fuelled	 violence,	 and	 with	 such	 haste	 that	 there	 was	 no	
opportunity	 for	 expert	 input,	 careful	 consideration	 or	 broader	 discussion.	 The	 legal	 and	
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operational	problems	that	have	been	examined	in	this	article	could	have	been	addressed	prior	
to	enactment	if	adequate	time	had	been	allowed	for	proper	consultation,	including	with	the	NSW	
Law	 Reform	 Commission,	 and	 the	 NSW	 Parliament’s	 Legislation	 Review	 Committee.	
Unfortunately,	these	problems	will	now	fall	to	be	resolved	in	the	context	of	operational	policing,	
prosecutorial	 discretion	 and	 the	 conduct	 of	 trials.	 These	 environments	 are	 not	 necessarily	
conducive	to	yielding	sound	interpretations	of	general	application	and	leave	no	opportunity	for	
the	emergence	of	a	considered	opinion	that	further	criminalisation	or	draconian	penalties	may	
not	 in	 fact	 be	 the	best	 regulatory	 tool	 for	 addressing	 the	problem	of	 alcohol‐related	violence.	
The	other	problem	is	that	the	government	has	set	high	expectations	for	how	one‐punch	deaths	
will	 be	 handled	 in	 the	 future	 and	 yet	 the	 legislation	 offers	 no	 guarantee	 that	 the	 harsh	
punishment	promised	by	the	government	will	be	delivered	in	any	given	case.		
	
	
Correspondence:	Dr	Julia	Quilter,	School	of	Law,	University	of	Wollongong,	NSW	2522,	Australia.	
Email:	jquilter@uow.edu.au	
	
																																																													
1	 The	 author	 thanks	 the	 participants	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Law	Workshop	 (held	 at	 Sydney	University,	 14‐15	
February	2014)	for	their	helpful	comments	on	an	earlier	paper.	The	author	also	thanks	Luke	McNamara	
for	his	thoughtful	comments	on	a	draft	of	this	paper.	
2	 The	 first	was	 added	 in	 2011	 for	murdering	 a	 police	 officer	 in	 execution	 of	 his	 or	 her	 duties	 and	 the	
mandatory	penalty	is	life:	Crimes	Act	1900	s	19B.	
3	Originally	nine	offences	were	mooted:	assault	occasioning	actual	bodily	harm;	assault	occasioning	actual	
bodily	harm	in	company;	assault	of	police	officer	in	the	execution	of	duty	(not	during	a	public	disorder);	
reckless	wounding;	 reckless	wounding	 in	 company;	 reckless	 grievous	 bodily	 harm;	 reckless	 grievous	
bodily	harm	in	company;	affray;	and	sexual	assault	(see	Roth	2014:	6).	
4	 The	 Liquor	 Amendment	 Act	 2014	 introduced:	 lockouts	 from	 1.30am;	 cessation	 of	 liquor	 service	 at	
3:00pm;	 imposition	 of	 similar	 licensing	 conditions	 as	 those	 already	 applied	 in	 Kings	 Cross	 to	 the	
expanded	Sydney	CBD	Entertainment	Precinct;	 an	expanded	 freeze	 to	 the	Sydney	CBD	Entertainment	
Precinct;	an	extension	of	 temporary	and	long‐term	banning	orders	to	the	new	Precinct;	prohibition	of	
takeaway	liquor	sales	after	10:00pm;	and	a	risk‐based	liquor	licensing	scheme	(based	on	factors	such	as	
trading	hours	and	records	on	previous	assaults).	
5	 The	 Crimes	 Amendment	 (Intoxication)	 Bill	 2014	 was	 read	 by	 the	 Premier	 for	 a	 second	 time	 on	 26	
February	 2014	 and	 passed	 by	 the	 Legislative	 Assembly	 on	 6	March	 2014.	 The	 Bill	was	 substantially	
amended	by	the	Legislative	Council	and	returned	to	the	Legislative	Assembly	on	19	March	2014	which	
rejected	the	amended	Bill	and	returned	it	to	the	Legislative	Council.	The	Legislative	Council	once	again	
rejected	the	Bill	on	26	March	2014.	What	becomes	of	this	Bill	remains	to	be	seen	but	it	is	expected	to	be	
considered	again	in	May	2014.	
6	See	the	petition	at:	change.org/thomaskelly.	At	the	time	of	writing	the	petition	has	144,	331	signatures	
and	the	website	claims	‘Victory’.	
7	‘Enough	is	Enough’	is	an	antiviolence	movement	established	by	Ken	Marslew	following	the	1995	murder	
of	his	18‐year‐old	son,	Michael	Marslew,	during	a	pizza	restaurant	robbery	(see	
http://enoughisenough.org.au/site/11/anti‐violence).	
8	The	Pinkie	ad	campaign	successfully	targeted	and	reduced	speeding	particularly	of	young	men.	The	ad	
was	said	to	slow	them	down	by	holding	up	a	little	pinkie	finger	and	convincing	them	that	if	they	sped,	
that’s	what	people	suspected	about	their	genitals	(Naggy	2014).	
9	Mr	McEwen	called	for	six	matters:	a	targeted	media	campaign	to	tackle	alcohol‐fuelled	violence	like	the	
‘pinkie	ad’;	 the	Newcastle	solution;	a	database	linking	pubs	and	clubs	 to	ensure	repeat	offenders	who	
are	 thrown	 out	 of	 one	 venue	 are	 not	 admitted	 to	 another;	 change	 of	 bail	 and	 good	 behaviour	 bonds	
revoking	 the	 rights	 of	 a	 person	 who	 commits	 an	 alcohol‐related	 crime	 to	 drink	 outside	 their	 home;	
introduce	 mandatory	 drug	 and	 alcohol‐testing	 of	 violent	 offenders;	 and	 a	 national	 ban	 on	 political	
donations	by	the	alcohol	and	gambling	industries	(McEwen	2014).		
10The	ABS	released	a	National	Offence	Index	(NOI)	in	2003	and	a	second	edition	in	July	2009.	The	NOI	is	
Australia’s	most	recognised	offence	seriousness	index.	See	ABS	(1997)	Australian	Offence	Classification	
(ASOC),	 1997	 Cat.No.1234.0.	 Canberra:	 ABS;	 ABS	 (2003)	 Criminal	 Courts,	 Australia	 2001‐02	 Cat.	
No.4513.0	Canberra:	ABS;	ABS	(Australian	Standard	Offence	Classification	(ASOC),	2008	(2nd	ed).	Cat.	NO.	
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1234.0.	Canberra:	ABS;	ABS	(2009)	National	Offence	Index	2009	Cat.	No.	1234.0.55.001.	Canberra:	ABS;	
ABS	(2010)	Criminal	Courts,	Australia	2008‐09	Cat.	No.4513.0	Canberra:	ABS.		
11This	means	 that,	unlike	other	provisions,	 such	as	 in	Victoria,	 there	 is	no	possibility	of	a	 judge	 finding	
‘special	reasons’	 to	reduce	the	mandatory	minimum:	see	Crimes	Amendment	(Gross	Violence)	Act	2012	
(Vic).	This	Act	amended	the	Crimes	Act	1958	(Vic)	to	introduce	offences	of	‘gross	violence’	(ss	15A	and	
B),	and	the	Sentencing	Act	1991	(Vic)	to	provide	a	mandatory	minimum	of	4	years	for	such	crimes,	but	
with	provision	for	a	lesser	sentence	where	the	judge	finds	‘special	reasons’	(ss	10	and	10A).	
12An	 aggregate	 sentence	 is	 where	 a	 court	 is	 ‘sentencing	 an	 offender	 for	 more	 than	 one	 offence’	 and	
imposes	an	aggregate	sentence	of	imprisonment	with	respect	to	all	or	any	2	or	more	of	those	offences	
instead	of	 imposing	a	 separate	 sentence	of	 imprisonment	 for	each:	Crimes	 (Sentencing	Procedure)	Act	
1999	(NSW)	s	53A.	
13The	six	offences	are	reckless	GBH	in	company	(s	35(1));	reckless	GBH	(s	35(2));	reckless	wounding	in	
company	 (s	 35(3));	 reckless	 wounding	 (s	 35(4));	 assault	 police	 officer	 –	 reckless	 GBH	 or	 wounding	
(public	 disorder)	 (s	 60(3A));	 assault	 police	 officer	 –	 reckless	 GBH	 or	 wounding	 (not	 during	 public	
disorder)	(s	60(3))	(O’Farrell	2014c).	
14This	mandatory	minimum	is	not	new	but	was	introduced	in	2011.	
15An	 assault	 is	 not	 authorised	 or	 excused	 by	 law	 if	 there	 is	 no	 consent	 to	 the	 assault	 or	 other	 lawful	
excuse.	
16For	instance	in	R	v	Munter	[2009]	NSWC	158,	the	66‐year‐old	victim	of	a	one‐punch	manslaughter	had	a	
history	of	hypertension	and	potentially	fatal	heart	disease.	After	the	one	punch	he	had	a	heart	attack	and	
died.	See	also	R	v	Irvine	[2008]	NSWCCA	273,	where	the	victim	of	a	one‐punch	manslaughter	suffered	a	
congenital	abnormality	that	contributed	to	his	death;	and	LAL,	PN	[2007]	NSWSC	445	in	which	the	two	
offenders	 assaulted	 a	 taxi	 driver	with	moderate	 force	but	 the	 victim	 suffered	 from	heart	 disease	 and	
died	 from	 a	 heart	 attack.	 A	 manslaughter	 trial	 in	 NSW	 that	 recently	 returned	 a	 not	 guilty	 verdict	
involved	a	situation	that	would	potentially	be	excluded.	 In	this	matter	Chab	Taleb	(a	 former	bouncer)	
was	involved	in	a	brawl	with	Jason	Daep	at	the	Pontoon	nightclub	in	Cockle	Bay	and	pushed	Daep	into	
the	water	where	he	drowned.	 In	 this	case,	Daep	died	not	because	of	 the	 injuries	 from	the	assault	nor	
from	hitting	a	hard	surface,	but	from	drowning.	
17A	definition	of	the	word	‘hitting’	contained	in	the	Crimes	Amendment	(Intoxication)	Bill	2014.	If	the	Bill	
is	passed	it	will		amend	s	25A	to	insert	the	following	definition	of	‘hits	another	person’:	
(2A)	For	the	purposes	of	this	section,	a	person	hits	another	person	if	the	person:	
(a)	hits	the	other	person	with	any	part	of	the	person’s	body,	or	
(b)	hits	the	other	person	with	a	thing	worn	or	held	by	the	person,	or	
(c)	forces	any	part	of	the	other	person’s	body	to	hit	the	ground,	a	structure	or	other	thing.	
This	 new	 definition	 is	 likely	 to	 extend	 the	 types	 of	 behaviours	 that	 come	within	 the	 ambit	 of	 s	 25A	
including	‘forcing’,	‘pushing’,	‘tackling’		as	discussed	below.	
18The	word	‘hit’	is	used	once	in	the	definition	of	‘violence’	in	s	93A	of	the	Crimes	Act		in	relation	to	riot	or	
affray,		violence	means	any	violent	conduct,	so	that:		
(a)	except	 for	 the	purposes	of	section	93C,	 it	 includes	violent	conduct	 towards	property	as	well	as	
violent	conduct	towards	persons,	and	
(b)	 it	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 conduct	 causing	or	 intended	 to	 cause	 injury	or	damage	but	 includes	any	
other	violent	conduct	(for	example,	throwing	at	or	towards	a	person	a	missile	of	a	kind	capable	of	
causing	injury	which	does	not	hit	or	falls	short).	
19The	Macquarie	Dictionary	defines	‘Hit	–verb	(t)	1.		to	deal	a	blow	or	stroke;	bring	forcibly	into	collision.’	
20The	Public	Defender’s	Office	of	NSW	Sentencing	Tables	for	unlawful	and	dangerous	act	manslaughter	
from	1998‐2013;	available	at	
http://www.publicdefenders.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/pdo/public_defenders_manslaught_unlawful_dang_act.
html?s=1001	(accessed	18	March	2014).	
21A	legal	argument	could	perhaps	be	made	that	a	tackling	constitutes	a	‘collision’	in	the	ordinary	meaning	
of	‘hitting’	as	noted	above.	
22Under	the	doctrine	of	transferred	malice	mens	rea	can	be	transferred	to	the	defendant.	Thus,	where	the	
defendant	attacks	someone	with	mens	rea	for	a	particular	offence,	misses,	but	nevertheless	‘accidentally’	
brings	about	the	actus	reus	for	the	same	offence	in	relation	to	a	different	person,	the	mens	rea	and	actus	
reus	can,	essentially	be	added	together,	and	the	offender	can	be	convicted	of	the	offence	(Brown	et	al.	
2011:	347).	The	doctrine,	however,	has	been	strongly	criticised	in	the	UK	(see	Brown	2011:	347).	For	s	
25A	offences,	however,	 the	offence	confines	the	intentional	hitting	to	the	other	person	which	seems	to	
exclude	the	doctrine.	
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23For	 example,	Homel	1997;	Road	Traffic	Accidents	 in	NSW	2001,	 Statistical	 Statement:	 Year	 ended	31	
December	2001	(RTA	Road	Safety	Strategy	Branch,	January	2003)	reveals	the	high	costs	of	drink‐driving	
not	only	in	terms	of	death	or	injury	to	drivers	and	other	users	of	the	roads,	but	also	in	terms	of	economic	
cost	 involving	 loss	 of	 earnings,	 decreased	 enjoyment	 of	 life,	 medical	 and	 hospital	 expenses,	 costs	
associated	with	damage	or	 loss	of	personal	property,	 and	 the	public	expenditure	on	 the	 investigation	
and	 prosecution	 of	 offenders.	 See	 also	 RTA,	 Drink	 Driving:	 Problem	 Definition	 and	 Countermeasure	
Summary	(August	2000)	at	2.	
24See,	 for	 example,	 above	 endnote	 23;	 see	 also	 Quilter	 2014b,	 where	 only	 four	 of	 the	 one‐punch	
manslaughters	did	not	involve	significant	alcohol	and/or	drug	consumption.	
25Perhaps	one	answer	is	that	there	is	a	generally	applicable	and	scientifically	proven	correlation	between	
drinking	and	driver	impairment	whereas	the	relationship	between	drinking	and	propensity	to	violence	
is	less	consistent.	For	instance,	the	NSWCCA	indicated	in	the	High	Range	PCA	guideline	judgment:	‘it	is	
axiomatic	that	the	higher	the	concentration	of	alcohol	in	the	blood	the	more	likely	it	is	that	the	person’s	
ability	to	control	and	manage	a	motor	vehicle	will	be	adversely	affected	and	the	greater	is	the	risk	of	the	
vehicle	 being	 involved	 in	 an	 accident.	 A	 blood	 alcohol	 reading	within	 the	 “high	 range”	 increases	 the	
probability	 of	 the	 vehicle	 crashing	 by	 25	 times,	 that	 is	 2,500	 per	 cent:	 RTA,	 Drink	 Driving:	 Problem	
Definition	and	Countermeasure	Summary	 (August	2000)	at	2.	 In	2001	of	1,055	motor	vehicle	drivers	
and	motorcycle	riders	killed	or	injured	and	who	had	a	blood	alcohol	concentration	over	the	legal	limit,	
50	per	cent	are	in	the	high	range;	RTA	Statistical	Statement,	above,	at	p	iii.’:	Application	by	the	Attorney	
General	 Concerning	 the	Offence	 of	High	 Range	 Prescribed	 Content	 of	 Alcohol	 Section	 9(4)	 of	 the	 Road	
Transport	 (Safety	 and	 Traffic	Management)	 Act	 1999	 (No	 3	 of	 2002)	 (2004)	 61	 NSWLR	 305	 at	 [10].	
Another	aspect	is	that	s	52A	offences	are	ones	of	strict	liability	whereas	s	25A	offences	(together	with	
the	nine	other	offences	that	are	to	be	introduced	in	late	February	2014)	are	mens	rea	offences.	
26While	not	the	subject	of	 this	article,	 it	 is	 troubling	that	the	 focus	of	 the	definition	in	the	Bill	 is	 ‘public’	
intoxication.	 This	 clearly	 leaves	 unregulated	 any	 ‘aggravated	 intoxicated	 offence’	 committed	 in	 a	
‘domestic’	setting,	be	it	domestic	violence	or	neighbour	or	other	private	violence.		
27It	is	noted	that	it	is	an	offence	to	refuse	to	provide	a	blood	or	urine	sample	pursuant	to	s	138G,	with	a	
maximum	penalty	of	50	penalty	units	or	imprisonment	for	2	years,	or	both:	LEPRA	s	138H(1).	
28Although	 it	 is	 noted	 that,	 under	 the	 Crimes	 Amendment	 (Intoxication)	 Bill	 2014,	 the	 time	 of	 the	
commission	of	the	offence	will	be	amended	to	 ‘the	police	officer	has	reason	to	believe	that	the	alleged	
offence	was	committed’:	Sch	2	cl	[3]	and	[6].	
29It	is	noted	that	the	time	periods	will	be	extended	under	the	Crimes	Amendment	(Intoxication)	Bill	2014.	
Thus,	for	breath	testing	and	analysis	under	LEPRA	s	138F(3),	instead	of	2	hours	after	the	commission	of	
the	offence	it	will	be	‘as	soon	as	possible	and	within	2	hours	after	the	police	officer	has	reason	to	believe	
that	the	alleged	offence	was	committed’	and	for	blood	and	urine	samples	under	LEPRA	s	138G	they	may	
be	conducted	up	to	12	hours	after	the	‘police	officer	has	reason	to	believe	that	the	alleged	offence	was	
committed’	(rather	than	the	original	four	hours):	see	Sch	2	cl	[6].	Furthermore,	Sch	1	[2]	will	introduce	a	
series	of	‘deeming’	provisions	into	the	Crimes	Act	s	8A(5)	such	that	any	concentration	of	alcohol	or	drug	
6	hours	after	the	alleged	offence	is	deemed	to	be	the	concentration	of	alcohol	at	the	time	of	the	alleged	
offence.	
30This	 is	 a	 common	practice	 in	 one‐punch	manslaughter	 cases	with	 17	 of	 the	 18	 such	matters	 in	NSW		
from	 1998‐2013	 involving	 guilty	 pleas	 and,	 on	 sentence,	 an	 agreed	 statement	 of	 facts	 including	 in	
relation	to	the	offender’s	 level	of	 intoxication.	 Indeed,	of	 the	one‐punch	manslaughter	cases,	only	 four	
did	not	involve	either	alcohol	or	drugs	and	in	all	cases	evidence	of	intoxication	or	drugs	came	from	the	
agreed	statement	of	facts:	see	Quilter	2014b.	
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